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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the protection of traditional knowledge ("TK") and cultural
expressions has received widespread international attention. In 2003, delegates
of 190 countries adopted the Convention on the Safeguarding of Intangible
Cultural Heritage ("2003 UNESCO Convention"). Developed under the
auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
("UNESCO"), this Convention sought to "safeguard the intangible cultural
heritage," "ensure respect" and appreciation for the materials, "raise awareness"
of their importance, and "provide for international cooperation and assistance."1
Entered into force in April 2006, the 2003 UNESCO Convention now features
more than 100 state parties. 2
Two years later, delegates from 148 countries, most of which had already
joined the 2003 UNESCO Convention, adopted the Convention on the
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions ("2005
UNESCO Convention"). 3 Focusing on "the diversity of cultural expressions, as
circulated and shared through cultural activities, goods and services,"'4 this new
convention aimed "to create the conditions for cultures to flourish and to freely
interact in a mutually beneficial manner" and "to encourage dialogue among
cultures" and countries. 5 It also "reaffirm[ed] the sovereign rights of States to
maintain, adopt and implement policies and measures that they deem
appropriate for the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural
expressions on their territory." 6 Entered into force in March 2007, the 2005
UNESCO Convention now includes more than ninety member states. 7 Although
1. Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage art. 1, Oct. 17, 2003, U.N.
Doc. MISC/2003/CLT/CH/14, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001325/132540e.pdf
[hereinafter 2003 UNESCO Convention].
2. U.N. Educ., Sci., & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], The States Parties to the Convention for the
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003), http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/
index.php?pg=00024 (last updated Feb. 23, 2009).
3. Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, Oct. 20,
2005, U.N. Doc. CLT-2005/CONVENTION DIVERSITE-CULT REV., available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf [hereinafter 2005 UNESCO Convention].
4. UNESCO, TEN KEYS TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE
DIVERSITY OF CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS 4 (2007), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/
001495/149502e.pdf.
5. 2005 UNESCO Convention, supra note 3, art. 1(b)-(c).
6. Id. art. 1(h). For a comprehensive discussion of cultural diversity issues in the international
trade context, see generally PATRICIA M. GOFF, LIMITS TO LIBERALIZATION: LOCAL CULTURE IN A
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (2007).
7. See UNESCO, Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
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both the 2003 and 2005 UNESCO Conventions "deal with expressions as
performed or enacted today," 8 the latter is more "aspirational . . . than
obligatory";9 it seems to be more interested in providing a platform for nurturing
a long-term dialogue than achieving short-term results.
In 2007, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ("DRIPS").10 Although DRIPS
was released in draft form in August 1994,11 it took more than a decade before it
was finalized in September 2007. With respect to the protection of intangible
cultural heritage, DRIPS declared:
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and
develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional
cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences,
technologies and cultures, including human and genetic resources,
seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral
traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual
and performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control,
protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural
heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.1 2
DRIPS echoes provisions in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
13
("UDHR"), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights14
("ICCPR"), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights15 ("ICESCR"), and other international human rights instruments.16 Out
Expressions, Paris, 20 October 2005, http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=31038&
language=E (last visited Feb. 24,2009) (listing signatories to convention).
8. UNESCO, 2003 Convention: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/
index.php?pg=00021 (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
9. Naomi Mezey, The Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 2004, 2013 (2007).
10. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295
(Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents[DRIPS-en.pdf
[hereinafter DRIPS].
11. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination &
Prot. of Minorities, Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1995/2, EICN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (Aug. 26, 1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 541,546-55 (1995).
12. DRIPS, supra note 10, art. 31(1).
13. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 27(1), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doe A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (declaring that "[e]veryone
has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community").
14. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (recognizing right of minorities "to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practise their own religion, or to use their own language").
15. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15(1)(a), Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCRI (recognizing right "[t]o take part in cultural life").
16. Article 15(2) of the International Labour Organization Convention No. 169, for example,
provides:
In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources or
rights to other resources pertaining to lands, governments shall establish or maintain
procedures through which they shall consult these peoples, with a view to ascertaining
whether and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or
permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining
20081
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of the International Bill of Rights, the ICCPR was the only covenant that
explicitly addresses the cultural rights of minorities. Article 27 of the ICCPR
provides: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community
with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practise their own religion, or to use their own language."' 7 Nevertheless, both
the UDHR and the ICESCR cover the area of intangible cultural heritage.
While article 27 of the UDHR states that "[e]veryone has the right freely to
participate in the cultural life of the community,"' 8 article 15(1)(a) of the
ICESCR obliges states to "recognize the right of everyone ... [t]o take part in
cultural life."'19
In addition, both the UDHR and the ICESCR safeguard the right to the
protection of moral and material interests in intellectual creations.20 As the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("CESCR"), the
authoritative interpretive body of the ICESCR, recently stated in its General
Comment No. 17:
With regard to the right to benefit from the protection of the moral
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of indigenous peoples, States parties should adopt
measures to ensure the effective protection of the interests of
indigenous peoples relating to their productions, which are often
expressions of their cultural heritage and traditional knowledge. In
to their lands. The peoples concerned shall wherever possible participate in the benefits of
such activities, and shall receive fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain
as a result of such activities.
Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries art. 15(2),
June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382, 1387 (1989). In addition, as I noted previously,
[RIeferences to cultural participation and development appear in many international and
human rights instruments, including the U.N. Charter, the UNESCO Constitution, the
Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination.
Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 1039, 1145-46 (2007) (citing Stephen A. Hansen, The Right to Take Part in Cultural
Life: Toward Defining Minimum Core Obligations Related to Article 15(1)(a) of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in CORE OBLIGATIONS: BUILDING A FRAMEWORK
FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 279, 282 (Audrey Chapman & Sage Russell eds.,
2002)).
17. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 27.
18. UDHR, supra note 13, art. 27(1).
19. ICESCR, supra note 15, art. 15(1)(a).
20. See id. art. 15(1)(c) (recognizing right "[t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or she] is the
author"); UDHR, supra note 13, art. 27(2) (recognizing similar right). For discussions of the right to
the protection of moral and material interests in intellectual creations, see generally Laurence R.
Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 971
(2007); Yu, supra note 16; Peter K. Yu, Ten Common Questions About Intellectual Property and
Human Rights, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 709 (2007).
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adopting measures to protect scientific, literary and artistic productions
of indigenous peoples, States parties should take into account their
preferences. 21
The CESCR is currently working on a general comment on article 15(1)(a) of
the ICESCR, which covers the right to cultural development and participation. 22
Outside the protections of human, cultural, and indigenous rights, less-
developed countries and traditional communities have actively pushed for
stronger protection of intangible cultural heritage. The World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO"), for example, established the
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources,
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore in September 2000 to address the
misappropriation of folklore, traditional knowledge, and indigenous practices.23
This intergovernmental committee provides "a forum for international policy
debate and development of legal mechanisms and practical tools concerning the
protection of traditional knowledge . . . and traditional cultural expressions
(folklore) against misappropriation and misuse, and the intellectual property...
aspects of access to and benefit-sharing in genetic resources." 24
To reform the Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT"), 25 Switzerland has
advanced a proposal to amend the PCT Regulations by explicitly enabling
national patent legislation to require the disclosure in patent applications of
traditional knowledge and genetic resources used in inventions for which
intellectual property rights are applied.26 Although the proposal makes the
disclosure requirement optional, that requirement, once implemented, will
21. ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights [CESCRI, General Comment No. 17:
The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from
Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the Author (Article 15, Paragraph
1(c), of the Covenant), $ 32, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf(898586bldc7b4043c1256a450044f331/03902145edbbe797c1257115005
84ea8/$FILE/G0640060.pdf.
22. See id. 4 (referring to forthcoming general comments on articles 15(1)(a), 15(1)(b), and
15(3)).
23. Peter K. Yu, Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property, and Indigenous Culture: An
Introduction, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 239, 239-40 (2003).
24. World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and
Traditional Cultural Expressions/Folklore, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en (last visited Jan. 31, 2009). See
generally Wend B. Wendland, "It's a Small World (After All)": Some Reflections on Intellectual
Property and Traditional Cultural Expression, in INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL
CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 150 (Christoph Beat Graber & Mira Burri-
Nenova eds., 2008) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL CULTURAL
EXPRESSIONS], for a description of the activities conducted by the WIPO Intergovernmental
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore.
25. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19,1970,28 U.S.T. 7645,1160 U.N.T.S. 231.
26. WIPO, Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty, Proposals by
Switzerland Regarding the Declaration of the Source of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge




enable the disclosed information to become part of international patent
applications.2 7
A group of developing countries advanced a similar proposal at the World
Trade Organization ("WTO").2 8 Initiated as a new article 29bis, the proposal
calls for an amendment to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement").2 9  If adopted, that
amendment would create an obligation to disclose in patent applications the
source of origin of biological resources and traditional knowledge used in
inventions for which intellectual property rights are applied.30 The proposal
further requires patent applicants to disclose their compliance with access and
benefit-sharing requirements under the relevant national laws. 31 Although a
large number of less-developed countries support the proposal, 32 the United
States and Japan strongly oppose it, expressing their fear that the additional
requirement would destabilize the existing patent system. 33
27. Emanuela Arezzo, Struggling Around the "Natural" Divide: The Protection of Tangible and
Intangible Indigenous Property, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 367, 381-82 (2007).
28. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop. Rights [TRIPS Council], The
Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity: Checklist of
Issues, IP/C/W/420 (Mar. 2, 2004) (providing checklist of issues that should be explored by TRIPS
Council, including disclosure of source of origin of biological resources and traditional knowledge used
in patent-seeking inventions); TRIPS Council, Elements of the Obligation to Disclose the Source and
Country of Origin of the Biological Resources and/or Traditional Knowledge Used in an Invention,
IP/C/W/429/Rev.1 (Sept. 27,2004) [hereinafter TRIPS Council, Elements of the Obligation to Disclose]
(discussing issues listed in checklist and proposing that TRIPS Agreement be amended to include
mandatory disclosure requirement); Arezzo, supra note 27, at 382-85 (discussing proposals to add
disclosure requirement in TRIPS Agreement).
29. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
30. See Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand and
Tanzania, Doha Work Programme-The Outstanding Implementation Issue on the Relationship
Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2, WT/GC/W/564/Rev.2
(July 5, 2006) [hereinafter Article 29bis Proposal] (requiring patent applicants to "disclose the country
providing the resources and/or associated traditional knowledge, from whom in the providing country
they were obtained, and, as known after reasonable inquiry, the country of origin").
31. See id. (requiring patent applications to "provide information including evidence of
compliance with the applicable legal requirements in the providing country for prior informed consent
for access and fair and equitable benefit-sharing arising from the commercial or other utilization of
such resources and/or associated traditional knowledge").
32. See William New, WTO Biodiversity Amendment Backed; EU Seeks 'New Thinking' on GIs,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH, Oct. 26, 2007, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=802
(describing support of majority of WTO membership).
33. See Arezzo, supra note 27, at 387-88 (noting United States' opposition due to its concern that
disclosure requirement would "render[. the application mechanism excessively burdensome and the
validity of its protection uncertain"). As Bronwyn Parry elaborated,
In the course of my research, I did not find any executives who were opposed to paying a
royalty of between 1 percent and 5 percent of net profits on products derived from natural
materials that were not collected domestically. Most large pharmaceutical companies (those
that generate large numbers of products and profits) now fully accept that they must pay for
their raw materials.... What companies emphatically do not wish to do, however, is to spend
[Vol. 81
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In addition, pursuant to the Doha Declaration, the TRIPS Council
continued "to examine ... the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and
the Convention on Biological Diversity [("CBD") and] the protection of
traditional knowledge and folklore." 34 The CBD 35 was established in 1992 to
promote "the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its
components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the
utilization of genetic resources." 36 Although the convention has had only limited
success, it remains one of the more "authoritative international instrument[s]"
on the protection of traditional knowledge and cultural expressions.
37
Finally, the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture ("ITPGR") "recognize[s] the enormous contribution that the local
and indigenous communities and farmers of all regions of the world . . . have
made and will continue to make for the conservation and development of plant
genetic resources which constitute the basis of food and agriculture production
throughout the world. '38 The treaty, which was adopted in November 2001, also
requires member states to take measures to protect and promote farmers'
rights,39 which are generally defined as "rights arising from the past, present and
future contributions of farmers in conserving, improving, and making available
plant genetic resources, particularly those in the centres of origin/diversity. '40
Although the ITPGR and the CBD contain different provisions, both
conventions play important roles in the preservation and conservation of
intangible cultural heritage. 41 Following the signing of the ITPGR, some
countries, like Costa Rica, India, the Philippines, Venezuela, and the Andean
Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) enacted laws or directives
to promote biological diversity.42
ever greater proportions of their operating budgets complying with an unnecessarily
cumbersome and unpredictable regulatory system.
BRONWYN PARRY, TRADING THE GENOME: INVESTIGATING THE COMMODIFICATION OF BIO-
INFORMATION 259-60 (2004).
34. World Trade Org. [WrTO], Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 19,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
35. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79
[hereinafter CBD].
36. Id. art. 1.
37. CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PLANT BIODIVERSITY, AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE 5 (2006).
38. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture art. 9(1), Nov. 3,
2001, available at ftp://ftp.fao.orglag/cgrfa/it/ITPGRe.pdf [hereinafter ITPGR].
39. Id. art. 9(2).
40. Farmers' Rights, Food & Agric. Org. Res. 5/89 (Nov. 29, 1989), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/
ag/cgrfa/Res/C5-89E.pdf.
41. See KEITH AOKI, SEED WARS: CONTROVERSIES AND CASES ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 126-27 (2008) (discussing convergence of CBD and ITPGR and
significance of such convergence).
42. See BRYAN BACHNER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CHINA: THE
MODERNIZATION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 22-23 (2009) (discussing Executive Order No. 247
of the Philippine Guidelines on Bioprospecting and the Andean Community's Common Regime on
Access to Genetic Resources); Stephen B. Brush, The Demise of 'Common Heritage' and Protection
2008]
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Taken together, all of these new conventions, declarations, laws, and policy
discussions have helped establish a new international framework for the
protection of intangible cultural heritage. The framework covers a wide array of
materials, including traditional knowledge and cultural expressions. UNESCO,
for instance, provides the following examples:
the oral traditions and expressions of the Aka Pygmies of Central
Africa, the Hudhud Chants of the Ifugao in the Philippines; performing
arts like the Royal Ballet of Cambodia; social practices, rituals and
festive events like the carnival of Binche in Belgium, the Indigenous
Festivity Dedicated to the Dead in Mexico, or the Vanuatu Sand
Drawings; knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe
such as the Andean Cosmovision of the Kallawaya in Bolivia;
traditional craftsmanship like Woodcrafting of the Zafimaniry in
Madagascar, or cultural spaces such as the Jemaa el-Fna Square in
Morocco or the Boyson District in Uzbekistan. 43
This Article examines both the theoretical and practical challenges
confronting the development and implementation of the framework for
protecting these materials. Part I disaggregates the term "intangible cultural
heritage" into two components-"intangible" heritage and "cultural" heritage.
Drawing on the similarities and differences between the protection of cultural
relics" and that of intellectual property, this Part argues that the different
emphasis on the term "intangible cultural heritage" may call for very different
protective regimes. This Part nevertheless points out that the similarities
for Traditional Agricultural Knowledge, in BIODIVERS1TY AND THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 297, 309-11 (Charles R. McManis ed., 2007)
[hereinafter BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW] (discussing India's Act No. 123 of 1999 for Protection of
Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights); Rodrigo G~1mez, The Link Between Biodiversity and Sustainable
Development: Lessons from INBio's Bioprospecting Programme in Costa Rica, in BIODIVERSrrY AND
THE LAW, supra, at 77, 83 (discussing Costa Rica's Biodiversity Law No. 7788); Vivienne Solis Rivera
& Patricia Madrigal Cordero, Costa Rica's Biodiversity Law: Searching for an Integral Approach to
Cultural and Biological Diversity, in ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE
440 (Barbara T. Hoffman ed., 2006) [hereinafter ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE] (same); Stanford
Zent & Egle6 L. Zent, On Biocultural Diversity from a Venezuelan Perspective: Tracing the
Interrelationships Among Biodiversity, Culture Change and Legal Reforms, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE
LAW, supra, at 91, 107 (discussing 2000 Biodiversity Law in Venezuela). For an excellent discussion of
biological diversity, see generally STEPHEN B. BRUSH, FARMERS' BOUNTY: LOCATING CROP
DIVERSITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (2004).
43. UNESCO, supra note 8.
44. Commentators have used the terms "antiquities," "cultural artifacts," "cultural objects,"
"cultural patrimony," and "cultural property," all of which are somewhat interchangeable. This Article
adopts the term "cultural relics," mainly because of its usage in Chinese law (winwat), the growing
problems created by the lack of protection in the area, and Part IV's focus on related enforcement
challenges in China. As Lyndel Prott and Patrick O'Keefe wrote,
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "relic" as "surviving trace or memorial of a custom,
belief, period, people etc.; object interesting for age or associations". It thus will include
artifacts of recent manufacture, as well as ancient artifacts (antiquities) and palaeontological
or historical material which is the subject of much modern legislation.
1 LYNDEL V. PRoTr & P.J. O'KEEFE, LAW AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE 4-5 (1984).
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between the two components may provide significant common grounds for
promoting further development and implementation of the framework.
Part II outlines eight different objectives for establishing this new
framework. While some of these objectives overlap or conflict with each other,
others touch on issues that are of only marginal concern to some constituencies.
By focusing on each of these objectives, this Part underscores the divergent, and
at times competing, interests amongst the many stakeholders within the
framework. This Part also foreshadows the potential challenges for these
stakeholders to achieve international consensus on the protection of intangible
cultural heritage.
Part III discusses four different challenges confronting the implementation
of the framework. Although this Part recognizes tribal sovereignty and the right
to self-determination as key prerequisites to the development of a successful
framework, it concedes that significant challenges are likely to remain even if the
sovereignty and right to self-determination of traditional communities are fully
respected. This Part focuses in particular on the mode of protection, the power
to define protectable subject matters, the means to identify those materials, and
the justifiability of international intervention.
Part IV revisits a crucial similarity between the protection of cultural relics
and that of intellectual property-the need for enforcement and the related
challenges. Using China as an illustration, this Part suggests that countries with
significant problems in both areas may provide important insights into the
development of the new framework for the protection of intangible cultural
heritage. This Part points out that the enforcement challenges in this framework
are likely to resemble those in the areas of cultural relics and intellectual
property. This Part concludes that China, as well as other countries that have
similar problems, may provide a rich and fertile ground for future research in
both areas.
I. CONCEPTUAL BASES AND ANALOGIES
Although there is a general consensus on the need to protect cultural
heritage, there is no generally agreed definition of "culture" or "cultural
heritage. '45 As Raymond Williams put it, "[c]ulture is one of the two or three
most complicated words in the English language. ' 46 A diverse array of
conventions, protocols, declarations, laws, policies, and guidelines therefore has
been established to protect cultural heritage and cultural diversity.47 As Lyndel
45. See Janet Blake, On Defining the Cultural Heritage, 49 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 61, 67-68 (2000)
(discussing difficulty in identifying "culture").
46. RAYMOND WILLIAMs, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 87 (rev. ed.
1985).
47. See, e.g., 2005 UNESCO Convention, supra note 3; 2003 UNESCO Convention, supra note 1;
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, Nov. 2, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 40;
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T.
37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151; Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 96 Stat. 2329, 823 U.N.T.S. 231
2008]
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Prott and Patrick O'Keefe aptly noted, "for various reasons each [UNESCO]
Convention or Recommendation has a definition drafted for the purposes of that
instrument alone; it may not, at this stage, be possible to achieve a general
definition suitable for use in a variety of contexts." 48 Likewise, Janet Blake
observed,
There may be no difficulty in understanding the intention of the
1970 UNESCO Convention as to the nature of the "cultural property"
which it protects. There is, however, a difficulty with any attempt to
identify exactly the range of meanings encompassed by the term
cultural heritage as used now in international law and related areas
since it has grown beyond the much narrower definitions included on a
text-by-text basis.
49
In fact, it is not uncommon for scholars and commentators to expect
"cultural heritage" to cover everything. As one scholar asked rhetorically in a
historic symposium on the loss and recovery of cultural property at the Bard
Graduate Center for Studies in the Decorative Arts, Design, and Culture in New
York,
What is cultural heritage? We may answer: everything, depending on
the level of cultural consciousness of a nation and the extent of its
knowledge of the past and its personal links with its heritage, for
"heritage" means documents of the past. And the value of these
documents can change. Some of those things that we appreciate might
not have been as important to our ancestors-and may not be
considered as valuable by future generations. 50
[hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention]; Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954,249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention].
48. PRoTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 44, at 8; accord Blake, supra note 45, at 63 (noting that lack of
generally agreed definition in these instruments means that each instrument "must be interpreted
internally without reference to any set of principles"); Lyndel V. Prott, Problems of Private
International Law for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage, 5 RECUEIL DES COURs 215, 224 (1989)
(stating that "[wihile cultural experts of various disciplines have a fairly clear conception of the
subject-matter of their study, the legal definition of the cultural heritage is one of the most difficult
confronting scholars today").
49. Blake, supra note 45, at 64.
50. Jan P. Pruszyfiski, Poland: The War Losses, Cultural Heritage, and Cultural Legitimacy, in
THE SPOILS OF WAR: WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFrERMATH: THE Loss, REAPPEARANCE, AND
RECOVERY OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 49, 50 (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997) [hereinafter SPOILS OF
WAR]; accord ECOSOC, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities,
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Study on the
Protection of the Cultural and Intellectual Property of Indigenous Peoples, % 24, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28 (July 28, 1993) (prepared by Erica-Irene Daes), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)E.CN.4.Sub.2.1993.28.En?Opendocument
[hereinafter Working Group Study] (noting that "'[hieritage' is everything that belongs to the distinct
identity of a people and which is theirs to share, if they wish, with other peoples"); see also Sarah
Harding, Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 291, 303 (1999) (defining cultural
heritage as "an individual or group creation of either a tangible or intangible good which, by virtue of
the creation process, customary use, historical event, or simply geographic proximity, becomes an
important expression of human or cultural life" and describing it as "a mishmash of things, including
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In light of this challenge, cultural heritage conventions and declarations
usually adopt all-encompassing definitions that are broad and vague. For
example, the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict ("1954 Hague Convention"), which was adopted at The Hague
in 1954, adopts the term "cultural property," which is further defined as
movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural
heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or
history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of
buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works
of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or
archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important
collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property
defined above.51
Notwithstanding the use of the term "cultural property" in the 1954 Hague
Convention, many scholars have found the term problematic. As they claim, the
term focuses unduly on ownership and protection, and the property label "has
acquired a wide range of emotive and value-laden nuances, from the arguments
of John Locke to the challenge of Communism in the first two-thirds of [the
twentieth] century. '52 In lieu of that term, they have suggested the term "cultural
heritage," 53 which has since been widely used in international documents and
"become the term of art in international law."'54
There are two different types of cultural heritage: tangible cultural heritage
and intangible cultural heritage. Although the protection of cultural heritage
initially focused primarily on the former, such protection has now been
frequently extended to the latter.55 The 2003 UNESCO Convention, for
example, covers "the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills-
as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated
therewith-that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as
songs, dances, stories, remedies, textile designs, sacred objects, drawings, works of art, sculpture and
architectural structures" (footnotes omitted)).
51. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 47, art. l(a).
52. Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick J. O'Keefe, "Cultural Heritage" or "Cultural Property?," 1 INT'L J.
CULTURAL PROP. 307, 309 (1992); accord Harding, supra note 50, at 298 (noting that "legal and
philosophical baggage" associated with term "cultural property").
53. See Harding, supra note 50, at 298 (defining "cultural heritage" and discussing history behind
trend disfavoring term "cultural property"); Prott & O'Keefe, supra note 52, at 307 (expressing clear
preference for term "cultural heritage" over "cultural property").
54. Blake, supra note 45, at 67. The term also suggests the expanded coverage of cultural
patrimony laws. See Lucille A. Roussin, Cultural Heritage and Identity, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 707, 707-10 (2003) (discussing distinction between "cultural heritage" and "cultural property" and
noting that "[t]he inseparability of 'cultural heritage' from the more strictly legal definition of 'cultural
property' is an emerging concept and one with which the law will have to grapple").
55. See Blake, supra note 45, at 72 (noting growing trend since the mid-1980s to provide greater
international recognition of intangible cultural heritage); Richard Kurin, Safeguarding Intangible
Cultural Heritage in the 2003 UNESCO Convention: A Critical Appraisal, 56 MUSEUM INT'L 66, 68
(2004) (noting that "[t]he formal effort to safeguard intangible cultural heritage through UNESCO
began three decades ago" with the acceptance of World Heritage Convention).
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part of their cultural heritage." 56 Likewise, the 2001 Universal Declaration on
Cultural Diversity broadly defines culture to cover "the set of distinctive
spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social
group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways
of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.
57
By extending coverage to intangible cultural heritage, the 2003 UNESCO
Convention has raised three additional challenges. First, as we learn from the
protection of intellectual property rights, the intangible nature of the protectable
subject matter has created serious boundary issues concerning the scope of
protection.58 The nonexcludable and nonrivalrous nature of the protection 59 has
also upset the traditional justifications for the protection of tangible cultural
heritage, the loss of which is considered irremediable and the ownership of which
is excludable and rivalrous. 60
Second, materials that are considered tangible cultural heritage can also be
protected as intangible cultural heritage. For example, the First Folio edition of
Shakespeare's Works can be protected as tangible cultural heritage. The
importance of this edition, its rarity, and its immense value speak for
themselves. 61 Thus far, only 228 of the original 1,000 copies survive.6 2 When a
copy was stolen from the Durham University Library a decade ago, the loss and
its subsequent recovery received wide media coverage. 63
56. 2003 UNESCO Convention, supra note 1, art. 2(1).
57. Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity pmbl., Nov. 2, 2001, U.N. Doc. CLT-20021WS/9,
available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127160m.pdf.
58. See Marshall Leaffer, Character Merchandising in the U.K., a Nostalgic Look, 11 U. MIAMI
ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 453, 454 (1994) (noting that "unlike physical property-land or chattels-
intangible property, by its very nature, has vague boundaries"); Peter S. Menell, Envisioning
Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 67-68 (2002) (noting that copyright law is
"a notoriously complex and subtle body of law").
59. For discussions of the nonrivalrous and nonexcludable nature of intellectual property, see
generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325,344-61 (1989); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83
TEx. L. REV. 1031, 1033-46 (2005).
60. See John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 339,
360-61 (1989) (noting while there may be many legitimate claims to access, "the object in question can
only be in one place").
61. As a newspaper article in The Guardian described,
The First Folio is the first published edition of the collected works of Shakespeare. It was
published in 1623, seven years after the playwright's death. The folio includes 36 plays, 18 of
which, including Macbeth, had never been printed before. Without the First Folio many of
Shakespeare's plays would probably have been lost forever, earning it the title of, "the most
important work in the English language". The plays were collected by Shakespeare's friends
and fellow actors John Heminge and Henry Condell, and were printed by Isaac Jaggard and
Edward Blount. About 1,000 copies of the First Folio were published, roughly a quarter of
which have survived into the present day. On its publication, the folio sold for £1. It now has
an estimated value of £15m.
Martin Wainwright, Missing Shakespeare: Stolen First Folio Surfaces in US, THE GUARDIAN
(London), July 12,2008, at 3.
62. Id.
63. E.g., Terri Judd, All's Well That Ends Well as Bard's Stolen Folio Is Found, THE INDEP.
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However, the plays in the book can also be protected as intangible cultural
heritage. The importance of this heritage is undeniable. Shakespeare's plays
have been used as the basis for future creative works, and the phrases and
vocabularies he used have now entered the English language as cultural
shorthand. As Durham's Chancellor, Bill Bryson, noted, the book "is a national
treasure, giving a rare and beautiful snapshot of Britain's incredible literary
heritage." 64 It is therefore no surprise that some have described the book as "the
most important work in the English language. '65 Had the plays been written
today, as compared to many centuries ago, there is no doubt that they would
receive some of the highest protections available under existing copyright law.
Third, "intangible cultural heritage is manifested in tangible forms. For
instance, knowledge and skills to build musical instruments are manifested in the
products: the instruments built. '66 Moreover, "[a]ll kinds of culture is [sic], in the
earliest stage, intangible." 67 There may be no clear distinction between tangible
and intangible cultural heritage. As Richard Kurin, the Acting Under Secretary
for History, Art, and Culture of the Smithsonian Institution, reminded us,
For many peoples, separating the tangible and the intangible seems
quite artificial and makes little sense. For example, among many local
and indigenous communities, particular land, mountains, volcanoes,
caves and other tangible physical features are endowed with intangible
meanings that are thought to be inherently tied to their physicality.
Similarly, it is hard to think of the intangible cultural heritage of
Muslims on the hajj, Jews praying at the western wall of Jerusalem's
temple, or Hindus assembling for the kumbh mela as somehow
divorced and distinct from the physical instantiation of spirituality. 68
In sum, there are challenges with respect to both the "cultural" and
"intangible" aspects of intangible cultural heritage. To help provide a better
understanding of the protection of such heritage, this Part compares the
"cultural" aspect of the protection of cultural relics and the "intangible" aspect
of the protection of intellectual property. Drawing on the similarities and
differences between these two forms of protection, this Part argues that the
differences in the two distinctive aspects of intangible cultural heritage may call
(London), July 12, 2008, at 2 (reporting recovery of 400-year-old First Folio edition of Shakespeare's
works stolen from Durham University Library in 1998); Wainwright, supra note 61 (same).
64. Wainwright, supra note 61.
65. Id.
66. Wim van Zanten, Constructing New Terminology for Intangible Cultural Heritage, 56
MUSEUM INT'L 36, 39 (2004) (footnote omitted); see also Kurin, supra note 55, at 70 (noting that
"[c]raft items.., are tangible, but the knowledge and skills to create them intangible").
67. Erin K. Slattery, Preserving the United States' Intangible Cultural Heritage: An Evaluation of
the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage as a Means to
Overcome the Problems Posed by Intellectual Property Law, 16 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 201,
208 (2006) (quoting Nobuo Ito, Intangible Cultural Heritage Involved in Tangible Cultural Heritage,
http://www.international.icomos.org/victoriafafls2003/papers/A3-2%2-%2 1to.pdf).
68. Kurin, supra note 55, at 70; accord Van Zanten, supra note 66, at 39 (noting that "[s]ome




for contrasting protective regimes. This Part, nevertheless, contends that there
are substantial similarities between these two forms of protection, and these
similarities may provide significant common ground for promoting the
protection of intangible cultural heritage.
A. Differences
At first glance, cultural relics and intellectual property are protected very
differently. First, cultural relics are usually tangible. The major disputes in this
area concern such artifacts or monuments as the Parthenon (Elgin?) Marbles
from Greece, the Rosetta Stone in the British Museum, Afo-A-Kom in
Cameroon, the Terracotta Army in China, the DunHuang Grottoes along the
Silk Road, and totem poles in the Pacific Northwest. Intellectual property, by
contrast, is intangible. It differs from real or personal property in its ability to
allow for nonrivalrous consumption. 69 The use of a single creative work does not
interfere with the use or enjoyment by others of that particular work. As a result,
multiple individuals can use and enjoy a single work at the same time, although
they may have to do so through different copies of the work.
Rosemary Coombe elegantly captured the distinction between cultural
relics and intellectual property: "[i]f the expressive, inventive, and possessive
individual dominates intellectual property laws, legitimizing personal control
over the circulation of texts, laws of cultural property protect the material works
(objects of artistic, archaeological, ethnological, or historical interest) of
culture." 70 As she elaborated,
[t]here is... a significant difference in the scope of the claims that can
be made on behalf of a culture and those that can be made on behalf of
an individual author. Copyright laws enable individual authors not only
to claim possession of their original works as discrete objects, but to
claim possession and control over any and all reproductions of those
works, or any substantial part thereof, in any medium. Cultural
property laws, however, enable proprietary claims to be made only to
original objects or authentic artifacts. 71
Unlike those of intellectual property, "mere copies or counterfeits [of cultural
relics] are of comparatively little value."72 As Susan Scafidi rightly observed,
"Greece would not be satisfied if its demand for return of the [Parthenon]
69. For discussions of nonrivalrous consumption, see generally Landes & Posner, supra note 59,
at 326; Lemley, supra note 59, at 1050.
70. ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP,
APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 220 (1998); see also SUSAN SCAFtDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE?:
APPROPRIATION AND AUTHENTICITY IN AMERICAN LAW 51 (2005) (noting that "intellectual property
protects the new and innovative; cultural property protects the old and venerated").
71. COOMBE, supra note 70, at 225 (footnote omitted).
72. SCAFIDI, supra note 70, at 50. But see Diego Cevallos, Quality Copies of Masterpieces at a
Modest Price, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 19, 2002 (reporting that "[m]useum quality reproductions
of the works of old masters like Leonardo da Vinci, Vincent van Gogh, Claude Monet and Pierre




marbles from Britain were answered with an artist's copy, nor is the British
Museum willing to accept a substitute. '73
Second, the goals of these two forms of protection are often quite different.
Due to the tangible nature of cultural relics, cultural patrimony laws tend to
focus on retention, repatriation, preservation, and authentication. As John
Henry Merryman, a leading authority in cultural patrimony law, stated,
"thinking about cultural property ... as part of a national cultural heritage...
legitimizes national export controls and demands for the 'repatriation' of cultural
property." 74 By contrast, except for moral rights, certification marks, and
geographical indications, intellectual property laws rarely share the same focus.
Repatriation, indeed, would be very difficult, especially when the works or
inventions have already fallen into the public domain. 75 The reproducibility and
nonexcludable nature of intellectual property also make repatriation somewhat
meaningless.
Instead, intellectual property laws focus on the commercial exploitation of
the works and knowledge (in addition to the maintenance of their control). For
example, copyright laws grant to authors the rights to reproduce, distribute,
adapt, publicly display, and publicly perform creative works. 76 Patent laws grant
to inventors the right to exclude others from manufacturing, distributing,
importing, selling, or offering to sell inventions.77 Trademark laws prevent others
from putting into commercial channels goods or services that are identified by
symbols that are identical to or confusingly similar to those sponsored by the
rights holders.78 Trade secret laws protect undisclosed information that has
commercial value.79 Finally, geographical indications identify the origin of goods
based on quality, reputation, or other characteristics that are essentially
attributable to the geographical origin.80
Third, the trade in cultural relics is different from that in intellectual
property goods or services. Because less-developed countries are generally
considered rich in cultural relics, 81 the trade in those materials usually flows from
less-developed to developed countries. Meanwhile, developed countries are
usually rich in intellectual property. The trade in intellectual property goods or
services therefore tends to flow in the opposite direction-that is, from
developed to less-developed countries. In light of these different directions of
73. SCAF1DI, supra note 70, at 50.
74. John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT'L L.
831, 832 (1986).
75. See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1185-87, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 2007) (challenging
constitutionality of Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, which restored copyright protection to
selected foreign works that had fallen into public domain in United States).
76. E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
77. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
78. E.g., Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006).
79. E.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETs ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 536 (2005).
80. E.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 23.
81. See Merryman, supra note 74, at 832 (noting that source nations "are rich in cultural artifacts
beyond any conceivable local use").
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trade flows, cultural relics are generally considered "Third World assets," while
intellectual properties are deemed "First World assets." 82 Although some
countries, like those in Europe, are rich in both cultural relics and intellectual
property, most are not. While Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru are rich in cultural
relics, but not in intellectual property, the United States is rich in intellectual
property, but not in cultural relics.
Finally, the source of protection for cultural relics is very different from that
for intellectual property. The source of protection for cultural relics is usually the
source nation.83 Thus, less-developed countries are often responsible for
enacting laws to protect their own relics, partly because they are in the best
position to know what to protect, and partly because the objects are usually
located on their soil.
Meanwhile, the source of protection for intellectual property is usually the
market nation. As stated in the Berne and Paris Conventions, the type of
protection offered in each country is to be determined locally as long as the
country satisfies the minimum standards and does not discriminate against
foreign rights holders.84 Likewise, Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement allows
member states "to determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice."
85
B. Similarities
Notwithstanding these differences, there are significant similarities between
the protection of cultural relics and that of intellectual property. In both areas,
the protections seek to enable the rights holders to exert control over the
protectable subject matters. It does not matter whether the materials are
tangible or not. Cultural patrimony laws identify those who have the ability to
control the use and display of the materials. 86 Similarly, intellectual property
82. See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World:
Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
689 (1989).
83. As Professor Merryman described,
[T]he world divides itself into source nations and market nations. In source nations, the
supply of desirable cultural property exceeds the internal demand. Nations like Mexico,
Egypt, Greece and India are obvious examples. They are rich in cultural artifacts beyond any
conceivable local use. In market nations, the demand exceeds the supply. France, Germany,
Japan, the Scandinavian nations, Switzerland and the United States are examples. Demand
in the market nation encourages export from source nations. When, as is often (but not
always) the case, the source nation is relatively poor and the market nation wealthy, an
unrestricted market will encourage the net export of cultural property.
Merryman, supra note 74, at 832 (footnotes omitted).
84. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 2, Sept. 9, 1886,
as revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 2, Mar. 20, 1883, as revised at Stockholm July
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
85. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 1(1).
86. As Judge French described in Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia, a case involving the
unauthorized reproduction of the sacred "Morning Star Pole" in an Australian $10 bank note,
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laws create rights to prevent others from exploiting the protected works without
the rights holders' authorization.
Second, both forms of protection raise difficult questions about the
appropriate balance between access and control. Raw materials are just as
important in art and culture as in creativity and innovation. Except for those who
believe in a strong notion of romantic authorship, 87 most people credit old art for
the creation of new art. As Professor Merryman reminded us, "[Airt comes from
art (as well as from social, political, and cultural forces acting on the artist). 88
In the intellectual property area, raw materials are also considered
important building blocks for both authors and inventors. To protect these raw
materials, intellectual property law emphasizes the protection of the public
domain.89 In the copyright area, for example, one can find safeguards like "the
originality requirement, the idea-expression dichotomy, durational limits .... the
fair dealing or fair use privilege, the exhaustion of rights or first sale doctrine, the
parody defense, and the de minimis use exception." 90
Third, some aspects of both forms of protection concern issues of
authenticity and integrity. The importance of authenticity of cultural artifacts is
Mr Yumbulul has authority within his own clan to paint certain sacred designs. He has
passed through various levels of initiation and revelatory ceremonies in which he has
gradually learnt the designs and their meanings. The authority to paint them derives from his
father. During the last initiation rite in which he participated, he was presented by the elders
of his clan with two sacred bags. Their presentation reflected the power and title he has been
given to paint the sacred objects of his people. It is from his mother's clan group, however,
that Mr Yumbulul has inherited the right to make Morning Star Poles, one of which is the
subject of these proceedings.
Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia (1991) 21 I.P.R. 481, 3 (Austl.). Erica-Irene Daes elaborated
further,
Under Aboriginal law, the rights in artistic works are owned collectively. Only certain artists
are permitted within a tribe to depict certain designs, with such rights being based on status
within a tribe. The right to depict a design does not mean that the artist may permit the
reproduction of a design. This right to reproduce or redepict would depend on permission
being granted by the tribal owners of the rights in the design.
Working Group Study, supra note 50,1 78.
87. For discussions of the construction of the romantic author, see generally MARK ROSE,
AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993); THE CONSTRUCTION OF
AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE (Martha Woodmansee & Peter
Jaszi eds., 1994); Carla Hesse, Enlightenment Epistemology and the Laws of Authorship in
Revolutionary France, 1777-1793, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 109 (1990); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of
Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455; Martha Woodmansee, The
Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the "Author," 17
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984).
88. Merryman, supra note 60, at 353-54.
89. For discussions of the public domain, see generally Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to
Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv.
354 (1999); David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981);
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Symposium, The Public Domain, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 1.




beyond question. As Professor Merryman observed, "We yearn for the
authentic, for the work as it left the hand of the artist or artisan.... The truth,
the certainty, the authenticity, seem to inhere in the original." 91
Intellectual property laws protect similar authenticity interests. In the moral
rights regime, for instance, the right of attribution enables authors to claim
authorship of the protected work, while the right of integrity prevents others
from distorting, mutilating, or modifying the work in a manner that would
prejudice the authors' honor or reputation. 92 Likewise, patent law respects and
emphasizes the identity of the inventors. The Paris Convention, for example,
stipulates, "[T]he inventor shall have the right to be mentioned as such in the
patent. '93 United States law further prohibits the grant of patents to those who
"did not [themselves] invent the subject matter. '94  This inventorship
requirement, which is undergirded by Article I of the United States
Constitution, 95 is indeed a main reason why the United States has yet to switch
from a first-to-invent system to the more widely used first-to-file system.96
Fourth, the beneficiaries initiate both forms of protection-developed
countries for stronger intellectual property protection and less-developed
countries for stronger protection of cultural relics. In fact, as I pointed out
elsewhere, "[c]opyright law has always been about stakeholders"--one could
91. Merryman, supra note 60, at 346. As he elaborated,
When we stand before the authentic Domesday Book in the Public Record Office in London
or the manuscript of Justinian's Digest in the Gregorian Library in Florence, we feel a sense
of satisfaction. This is the real thing, speaking truly of its time. When we discover that the
original of the Digest manuscript is kept elsewhere for protection and we have actually been
looking at a reproduction, we feel cheated, no matter how accurate the reproduction might
be.
Id.
92. For discussions of moral rights, see generally Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and
the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1997); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, "Author-Stories:" Narrative's
Implications for Moral Rights and Copyright's Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2001);
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38
VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985); Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 795 (2001); Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author
Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1994).
93. Paris Convention, supra note 84, art. 4ter.
94. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2006).
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall have Power ... [t]o Promote the Progress of...
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective...
Discoveries....").
96. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the
United States' Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 6 (2004) (noting that
"Congress would not have the power under the Constitution to change the patent law to redefine the
term 'inventor' to mean the first to file a patent application"); Max Stul Oppenheimer, Harmonization
Through Condemnation: Is New London the Key to World Patent Harmony?, 40 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 445, 445 (2007) (discussing constitutional issues raised by first-to-file system); Karen
E. Simon, Comment, The Patent Reform Act's Proposed First-to-File Standard: Needed Reform or
Constitutional Blunder?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 129, 139-46 (2006) (analyzing
constitutionality of first-to-file standard proposed in Patent Reform Act of 2005).
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view intellectual property protection as a form of protection for the "haves." 97
Those who have interests in the system are eager to protect what they have,
while those who do not are likely to find the laws counterintuitive, annoying, and
socially pernicious.
Scholars have made similar observations about the protection of cultural
patrimony. Those who argue for weaker protection of cultural relics-or for a
broader view of the world cultural heritage-are often those who do not have a
lot of protectable treasures within their country. Those who argue for stronger
protection, by contrast, are likely those who have objects worth protecting in
their country. It is, therefore, no surprise that source nations make up the
majority of the membership98 of the UNESCO Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership
of Cultural Property99 ("1970 UNESCO Convention").
Fifth, both forms of protection concern barriers put up to reduce illicit trade
across borders. Because it is no longer possible to rely on national measures
alone, global solutions are increasingly needed in both areas. To some extent, the
need for global cooperation is similar to the need for international policy
coordination in other cross-border problems, such as terrorism, drug trafficking,
refugees, illegal immigration, environmental degradation, illegal arms sales,
nuclear proliferation, and corruption. 100
In fact, commentators and policymakers in both areas have increasingly
emphasized the organized structure of illicit trade. For example, they have tied
piracy and counterfeiting to terrorism and organized crime. 10 1 Similar linkage
can be found in the looting of and illicit trade in cultural relics. As Patty
Gerstenblith noted, "Recent revelations concerning the functioning of the art
market and the acquisition of antiquities with unknown origins now demonstrate
that the looting of archaeological sites is a well-organized big business motivated
primarily by profit."1 2
97. Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDoZO L. REV. 331,402 (2003).
98. See Michael L. Dutra, Sir, How Much Is That Ming Vase in the Window?: Protecting Cultural
Relics in the People's Republic of China, 5 AsIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL'Y J. 62, 77 (2004) (noting that "a
few of the major market nations-the United States, and recently, the United Kingdom and Japan-
have joined the [1970 UNESCO Convention], while most of the source states of cultural property have
signed th[at] Convention").
99. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 47.
100. See Judith H. Bello, National Sovereignty and Transnational Problem Solving, 18 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1027, 1027 (1996) (discussing many cross-border problems that continue to challenge national
laws in increasingly interdependent world).
101. See, e.g., International Copyright Piracy: A Growing Problem with Links to Organized Crime
and Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 4 (2003) (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, H. Comm. on the Judiciary); TIM
PHILLIPS, KNOCKOFF: THE DEADLY TRADE IN COUNTERFErr GOODS 137-44 (2005); Maureen
Walterbach, Comment, International Illicit Convergence: The Growing Problem of Transnational
Organized Crime Groups' Involvement in Intellectual Property Rights Violations, 34 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 591 (2007).
102. Patty Gerstenblith, Controlling the International Market in Antiquities: Reducing the Harm,
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One could even make an argument that the problem of illicit trade in
cultural relics far exceeds that in pirated and counterfeit goods. According to
Roger Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs,
"INTERPOL estimates the value of the illicit trade in art and artifacts
worldwide each year at $5 billion-only the illegal markets in drugs and arms are
larger."103 In the past decades, accelerated efforts have been undertaken to
develop "harmonized" solutions for the protection of both cultural relics and
intellectual property. Although such harmonization efforts have their drawbacks
and limitations, 1°4 there is general agreement that domestic solutions are
inadequate for dealing with illicit cross-border trade.
Finally, as Part IV will discuss further, both forms of protection concern the
same type of enforcement issues and challenges, and both developed and less-
developed countries suffer from the lack of or inadequate protection. Illicit trade
in cultural relics can hurt a country as much as, if not more than, illicit trade in
pirated or counterfeit goods. Unfortunately, because of the different source of
protection, less-developed countries are charged with enforcement in both areas.
As a result, enforcement in both areas is fairly limited-due partly to the
countries' lack of capacity and resources for active law enforcement. 10 5 As one
commentator wrote of China,
[T]he task of protecting cultural property in China is a herculean task
of almost impossible magnitude. The sheer amount of cultural property
in China is enormous. It is virtually impossible for the government to
halt the illegal flow of cultural property out of-and within China.
Because the international legal regime designed to protect cultural
property is unlikely to be of much help, China must rely on its
domestic laws to preserve its cultural heritage, as once objects have left
Preserving the Past, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 169,169 (2007); accord Matthew Bogdanos, Thieves of Baghdad:
Combating Global Traffic in Stolen Iraqi Antiquities, 31 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 725, 726 (2008)
(declaring that "the genteel patina covering the world of antiquities rests atop a solid base of criminal
activity"). For an interesting account of the recent looting of the National Museum of Iraq in Baghdad,
see generally MATTHEW BOGDANOS WITH WILLIAM PATRICK, THIEVES OF BAGHDAD: ONE
MARINE'S PASSION FOR ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS AND THE JOURNEY TO RECOVER THE WORLD'S
GREATEST STOLEN TREASURES (2005).
103. Roger F. Noriega, Helping the Hemisphere Recover and Preserve Its Cultural Patrimony,
http://statelists.state.gov/scripts/wa.exe?A2=indO4O8c&L=dossdo&P=177 (last visited Feb. 10, 2009)
(emphasis added).
104. For discussions of the benefits and drawbacks of harmonization, see generally John F.
Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685 (2002); Peter K.
Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
323, 429-35 (2004).
105. See PRoTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 44, at 331 (noting suggestion that "the entire police force
and military forces of Turkey together could not possibly keep watch over all the archaeological sites
in that country"); Dutra, supra note 98, at 65 (noting that "[mI]any source nations are poorer states
with weak central governments that lack the resources or the will to protect and preserve
archaeological sites and relics"); Eric A. Posner, The International Protection of Cultural Property:
Some Skeptical Observations, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 213, 217 (2007) (arguing that "[tihe origin states, which
were often poor countries with weak institutions, could do little to prevent looters from extracting
antiquities and sought assistance from the wealthy states to which the antiquities were exported").
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Chinese territory, they are likely gone forever. However, Chinese law
is not yet capable of taking on this formidable task. 10 6
This observation is quite similar to those on inadequate enforcement in the
intellectual property area-online piracy primarily in developed countries and
optical disc and offline piracy in less-developed countries. 10 7 Nevertheless,
because of the importance of enforcement in both areas, enforcement issues may
provide a promising opportunity for both developed and less-developed
countries to cooperate. Although each country group is likely to seek protection
for very different objects-developed countries for stronger intellectual property
protection and less-developed countries for stronger protection of cultural
relics-both of them are likely to be interested in building a stronger
enforcement environment that will protect their interests. Such cooperation
would enable these countries to work together, sharing with each other
experience, knowledge, and best practices about law enforcement in general.
In sum, the protection of cultural relics and that of intellectual property are
more similar than one would expect. As Erica-Irene Daes, the Special
Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities and the chairperson of its Working Group on
Indigenous Populations, wrote in her report, "[I]t is both simpler and more
appropriate to refer to the collective 'heritage' of each indigenous people, rather
than make distinctions between 'cultural property' and 'intellectual
property'."' 1 8 It also makes sense for the intellectual property model to be
increasingly proposed as a means of protection for traditional knowledge and
cultural expressions.
Moreover, intellectual property protection goes hand in hand with the
production of cultural products.10 9 As Professor Scafidi pointed out, "A review
of intellectual property and its unique characteristics will thus assist in
formulating a theory of cultural ownership and protection."'"10 A better
understanding of these two forms of protection may also inform the discussion of
106. Dutra, supra note 98, at 73 (footnotes omitted); see also J. DAVID MURPHY, PLUNDER AND
PRESERVATION: CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 62
(1995) (noting that "[ilnstitutional insecurity, lack of funding, inadequate procedures, and corruption
have combined to contribute to the steady outflow of relics from China").
107. See Peter K. Yu, Three Questions That Will Make You Rethink the U.S.-China Intellectual
Property Debate, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 412, 417 (2008) (observing that optical disc
piracy happens mostly in China and other less-developed countries and online piracy happens
extensively in developed countries); Aaron Schwabach, Intellectual Property Piracy: Perception and
Reality in China, the United States, and Elsewhere, 2 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 65, 77-78 (2008) (stating
that difference between optical disc piracy and online piracy may have skewed public perception of
piracy and counterfeiting problems in China and other less-developed countries).
108. Working Group Study, supra note 50, 1 23.
109. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
288 (1996) (stating that "[c]opyright provides an incentive for creative expression on a wide array of
political, social, and aesthetic issues, thus bolstering the discursive foundations for democratic culture
and civic association"); Yu, supra note 107, at 427-28 (discussing relation between copyright
protection and production and dissemination of cultural products).
110. SCAFIDI, supra note 70, at 13.
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the protection of intangible cultural heritage. Nonetheless, it is important to be
cautious about the differences between these two forms of protection. Whether
policymakers identify the protection of intangible cultural heritage with that of
cultural relics or that of intellectual property may ultimately result in a different
protective regime.
II. UNDERLYING OBJECTIVES
Thus far, traditional communities, governments, and intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations have advanced many different proposals and
models to protect intangible cultural heritage. For example, as the Introduction
noted, regimes in the area of human, cultural, and indigenous rights include a
number of documents calling for stronger protection of intangible cultural
heritage. There are also many active developments in the areas of international
trade, intellectual property, and biological diversity.
To help us understand the stakes involved in the development of this new
framework for the protection of intangible cultural heritage, this Part highlights
eight of the framework's many underlying objectives. These objectives are
neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive; they can be achieved through the use
of different mechanisms, which range from exclusive rights to liability rules and
from benefit-sharing agreements to disclosure requirements. This Part does not
discuss each of these mechanisms, which are already covered in a vast amount of
literature in the area.111 However, it is important to remember each mechanism
may achieve various objectives, and several mechanisms may sometimes be
needed to achieve a single objective. It is also worth keeping in mind that each
objective may raise questions and issues that are addressed elsewhere.
Moreover, some readers may find the description of the objectives in this
Part somewhat messy. Such messiness, however, is rather common in any
negotiation for a new international framework for the protection of intangible
cultural heritage. Rather than offering a subjective evaluation of the importance
and urgency of each objective, or delineating some organizing principles, this
Part presents the objectives as they appear in the current policy debate. After all,
policymakers, commentators, activists, and the public at large are likely to value
these objectives differently. By presenting the objectives together, this Part also
helps illustrate why it is difficult to achieve international consensus. Although
WIPO and other international intergovernmental organizations have actively
pushed for stronger international protection of traditional knowledge and
cultural expressions, no treaty has been adopted yet.11 2
111. See, e.g., Graham Dutfield, Legal and Economic Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 495 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS].
112. See infra note 276 and accompanying text for a discussion of WIPO's failure to adopt a




While globalization, the digital revolution, and increasing commodification
of information have enriched the lives of many traditional communities, these
factors have equally threatened these communities by allowing for the
instantaneous distribution of knowledge and materials that are sacred or
intended to be kept secret. 113 As Angela Riley noted, such unauthorized
reproduction and distribution remains "one of the biggest problems faced by
indigenous groups today."" 14
From the standpoint of traditional communities, secrecy is important for
both cultural and spiritual purposes. As Tom Greaves explained,
[T]he control of traditional ideas and knowledge ... identifies places,
customs and beliefs which, if publicly known, will destroy parts of a
people's cultural identity. Sometimes it is knowledge entrusted only to
properly prepared religious specialists. Disclosure to other, unqualified
members destroys it. Sometimes it is knowledge shared among all of a
society's members, but not with outsiders. Such knowledge charters a
society's sense of self; to disclose it loosens the society's self-
rationale. 115
The ability for these peoples to keep ideas and knowledge secret is, therefore,
very important. As Sarah Harding explained, "secrecy is an integral part of the
sacredness of certain objects, stories, songs or rituals, and as such, instrumental
in maintaining a certain social structure within the cultural group. [It] helps
protect rituals and customs from destructive external forces." 116
Although traditional communities underscore the importance of protecting
sacred objects and expressions, it has not been easy to distinguish between what
is sacred and what is not. Making such a distinction sometimes may even be
impossible, given the communities' holistic worldview and lack of distinction
between sacredness and secularity. As the late Darrell Posey explained,
All creation is sacred, and the sacred and secular are inseparable.
Spirituality is the highest form of consciousness, and spiritual
consciousness is the highest form of awareness. In this sense a
dimension of traditional knowledge is not local knowledge but
knowledge of the universal as expressed in the local. In indigenous and
local cultures, experts exist who are peculiarly aware of the organizing
principles of nature, sometimes described as entities, spirits, or natural
113. See Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Promise of Globalization: An Essay on
Rights and Responsibilities, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 155, 159 (2004).
114. Id. at 157.
115. Tom Greaves, IPR, A Current Survey, in INTELLECT'UAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, A SOURCEBOOK 1, 4 (Tom Greaves ed., 1994) [hereinafter IPR
SOURCEBOOK]; accord Harding, supra note 50, at 313 (stating that "Im]any indigenous peoples
consider certain objects, as well as certain knowledge, limited goods that cannot be shared and
disseminated without a corresponding loss in power, significance, and meaning" and that "certain
objects and information must remain concealed from the uninitiated either within or outside the
cultural group").
116. Harding, supra note 50, at 314 (footnote omitted).
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law. Thus, knowledge of the environment depends not only on the
relationship between humans and nature but also between the visible
world and the invisible spirit world. According to the Ghanaian writer
Kofi Asare Opoku, the distinctive feature of traditional African
religion is that it is "A way of life, [with] the purpose of ... order[ing]
our relationship with our fellow men and with our environment, both
spiritual and physical. At the root of it is a quest for harmony between
man, the spirit world, nature, and society." The unseen is, therefore, as
much a part of reality as that which is seen-the spiritual is as much a
part of reality as the material. In fact, there is a complementary
relationship between the two, with the spiritual being more powerful
than the material. 117
Even if the materials are not sacred or intended to be kept secret, it is important
that the materials are not used in a way that would offend traditional
communities-as in OutKast's culturally insensitive performance of their hit
"Hey Ya" during the internationally televised Grammy Awards Ceremony in
2004118 and the University of Illinois' use for more than eighty years of its
fictitious Indian mascot Chief Illiniwek. 119
117. Darrell Addison Posey, Selling Grandma: Commodification of the Sacred Through
Intellectual Property Rights, in CLAIMING THE STONES/NAMING THE BONES: CULTURAL PROPERTY
AND THE NEGOTIATION OF NATIONAL AND ETHNIC IDENTITY 201, 201 (Elazar Barkan & Ronald
Bush eds., 2002) [hereinafter CLAIMING THE STONES] (alteration in original); accord WIPO,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 1 (2002), available at
http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/tk/920/wipo-pub-920.pdf [hereinafter WIPO, IP & TK]
(noting that "TK forms part of an holistic world-view, and is inseparable from their very ways of life
and their cultural values, spiritual beliefs and customary legal systems"); see also George P. Nicholas &
Kelly P. Bannister, Copyrighting the Past? Emerging Intellectual Property Rights Issues in
Archaeology, 45 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 327, 331 (2004) (noting that "[w]here there is no
cognitive separation between past and present, ancestral spirits are part of the present"); Angela R.
Riley, "Straight Stealing": Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural Property Protection, 80 WASH. L.
REv. 69, 77 (2005) (stating that "[f]or indigenous peoples, the natural, physical world is inexorably
intertwined with the spiritual and cultural world" and that "the stripping of tangible property often
results in corresponding cultural destruction").
118. See Riley, supra note 117, at 70-72 (discussing OutKast's performance and related issues
concerning appropriation of culture and traditional knowledge); Eireann Brooks, Note, Cultural
Imperialism vs. Cultural Protectionism: Hollywood's Response to UNESCO Efforts to Promote
Cultural Diversity, 5 J. INT'L BuS. & L. 112, 117-18 (2006) (discussing outrage of Native American
leaders following OutKast's performance). As Brooks described,
The band utilized "an ethereal, Indian-sounding melody" to introduce their performance,
then segued into a dance routine with backup dancers clad in skimpy "buckskin bikinis,
[with] long braids and feathers in their hair." At a later point during the performance, the
dancers "hit their open mouths with flat palms, imitating a traditional Plains-tribe war cry."
In addition, OutKast was joined onstage by the acclaimed University of Southern California
marching band, whose hats were decorated with feathers to contribute to the theme.
Native American leaders were outraged by the perpetuation of "tomahawk-and-tipi
stereotypes," likening OutKast's performance to a crude blackface routine. Not only were
the Indian symbols used of a type traditionally reserved for ceremonial purposes, but the
song used as a prelude to "Hey Ya" was also a sacred Navajo song wrongly appropriated for
entertainment purposes.
Brooks, supra, at 117-18 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Riley, supra note 117, at 70).
119. See Jodi S. Cohen, Hail to the Chief-and Farewell, CHI. TRiB., Feb. 22, 2007, at C1
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Even if the communities do not find the use of these materials offensive,
they may prefer to keep their ideas and knowledge out of commercial channels.
As Professor Daes noted, "indigenous peoples challenge the fundamental
assumptions of globalization. They do not accept the assumption that humanity
will benefit from the construction of a world culture of consumerism." 120 Indeed,
consumerism may have little meaning to these communities. As she wrote earlier
in her report for the Working Group on Indigenous Populations,
Possessing a song, story or medicinal knowledge carries with it certain
responsibilities to show respect to and maintain a reciprocal
relationship with the human beings, animals, plants and places with
which the song, story or medicine is connected. For indigenous
peoples, heritage is a bundle of relationships, rather than a bundle of
economic rights. The "object" has no meaning outside of the
relationship, whether it is a physical object such as a sacred site or
ceremonial tool, or an intangible such as a song or story. To sell it is
necessarily to bring the relationship to an end.121
Traditional communities may also "fear for the well-being of [their
communities] in the face of commercial exploitation, and . . . worry that the
expropriation of their living culture will cause their imagery to lose its original
significance which will lead to a disruption of their practiced religion and beliefs
and a dissolution of their culture."'122 Indeed, as Professor Scafidi pointed out,
"[a] cultural product reduced to the state of a mere commodity by the
destruction of its intangible value is unlikely to be restored to the source
community.' '123
Thus, it is understandable why commentators have been concerned about
the continuous push for intellectual property rights to protect traditional
knowledge and cultural expressions. After all, the intellectual property system
"was largely developed in the West, and its models are based on a capitalistic
philosophy designed to serve a market economy," which is quite different from
philosophies embraced by traditional communities. 124 It is therefore no surprise
that Naomi Roht-Arriaza asked whether "[b]y attempting to manipulate the
prevailing Western paradigm to suit their needs .... indigenous peoples [will]
(reporting on Chief Illiniwek's retirement); Jon Saraceno, Illini's Chiefs Final Dance Here at Last,
USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2007, at 2C (same). For an informative documentary on Chief Illiniwek, see IN
WHOSE HONOR? (New Day Films 1997).
120. Erica-Irene Daes, Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples, 95 AM. SOCY INT'L PROC.
143, 143 (2001).
121. Working Group Study, supra note 50, 1 26.
122. Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property
the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1997).
123. SCAFIDI, supra note 70, at 104.
124. Riley, supra note 113, at 159; accord Paul J. Heald, The Rhetoric of Biopiracy, 11 CARDOZO
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 519, 529 (2003) (observing that "[c]reating new property rights is ... a rather
Western form of problem solving"); Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on
Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual Property Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229, 246
(1998) (stating that "[m]ost intellectual property law models are based on Western, capitalist
philosophy, and indeed appear to be developed with such a world view in mind").
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accelerate the very commodification of knowledge and of living things that many
find so objectionable."' 25
Concerns about potential loss of heritage also explain why traditional
communities are generally skeptical of open access arrangements, such as those
relying on the development of a commons. As Michael Brown pointed out,
"[f]rom the indigenous-rights perspective, the public domain is the problem, not
the solution, because it defines traditional knowledge as a freely available
resource."1 26 In fact, the existing push for open access arrangements often
ignores the inequitable conditions and distribution problems in the current
socioeconomic system.127 As Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder reminded
us, "free and open access had the tendency to suggest 'a commons where
resources are up for grabs by the most technologically advanced.""' 128 Because
one's success in the commons depends on factors like knowledge, wealth, power,
access, and ability, an open access approach does not benefit everybody
equally.129 Such an approach, therefore, may be of limited assistance to the poor,
the backward, the needy, and the politically marginalized.
To make things more complicated, "[t]here may not always be consensus
within a community . . . as to what is or is not acceptable use of culturally
significant images in works intended for commercial sale.' 130 While some
members of the communities may object to any usage for commercial purposes,
others would allow the use of some materials at selected times under certain
conditions. Thus, it is important to let the communities determine for themselves
what materials can be used for commercial purposes. In doing so, the
communities could "make careful determinations about which events [or objects]
are appropriate for outsiders based on norms of tribal law, allowing such
125. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific and
Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 919,956 (1996).
126. MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 237 (2003); see also Dutfield, supra
note 111, at 531 (noting one of chief defects of many existing proposals to protect interests of
traditional communities is that "they leave the legal character of the public domain untouched").
127. For a criticism of commons-based approaches, see inupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder,
The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1351-54 (2004).
128. Id. at 1356 n.131 (quoting J.M Spectar, Saving the Ice Princess: NGOs, Antarctica &
International Law in the New Millennium, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 57,63 (1999)).
129. See id. at 1332. As Professors Chander and Sunder noted,
Contemporary scholarship extolling the public domain presumes a landscape where each
person can reap the riches found in the commons.... [B]ecause a resource is open to all by
force of law, it will indeed be equally exploited by all. But, in practice, differing
circumstances-including knowledge, wealth, power, and ability-render some better able
than others to exploit a commons.
Id.
130. WAYNE SHINYA, COPYRIGHT POLICY BRANCH, DEP'T OF CANADIAN HERITAGE,
PROTECTING TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS: POLICY ISSUES AND CONSIDERATIONS FROM A
COPYRIGHT PERSPECTIVE 35 (2004).
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revenue-generating activities only where they will not infringe on cultural
privacy or religious dictates.' 31
In recent years, cultural group leaders, policymakers, and commentators
have called for greater protection of "cultural privacy"-that is, "the right of
possessors of a culture-especially possessors of a native culture-to shield
themselves from unwanted scrutiny."1 32 The recently adopted Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, for example, stipulates that
[ijndigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practise, develop and
teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies;
the right to maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to their
religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and control of their
ceremonial objects; and the right to the repatriation of their human
remains.1 33
Likewise, Professor Brown reminded us that "[a] right to cultural privacy is
presented as self-evident and morally unassailable, even if its scope remains
unspecified.' 134
B. Authenticity
The second objective concerns the authenticity of the protected materials. If
the contributions of traditional communities are to be recognized, these
materials need to be authentic. Unfortunately, as shown in many reproductions
of Maya steles, Aboriginal crafts, and Native American rugs, nontraditional
producers and copycats usually have very limited understanding of the culture
that the works embody. In the end, they produce materials that not only free-
ride on the efforts and contributions of traditional communities, but fail to make
sense to those communities or researchers who study their culture.
For example, "Aboriginal Australian artists, writers and actors complained
that non-Aboriginals were taking the initiative in utilizing Aboriginal motifs and
themes, often resulting in misinterpretations and negative stereotypes."1 35 They
have also been concerned about "the utilisation of reproductions of traditional
Aboriginal designs as a means of decorating a host of mundane products
primarily developed for the tourist trade, such as tea-towels, pencil cases, key
rings, tee-shirts[,] ... drink coasters[,] . .. wall hangings, carpets and posters."'1 36
Furthermore, "[i]n Peru, local workers manufacture and sell replicas of golden
artifacts symbolizing Incan culture with no remembrance or connection to the
heritage that created such artifacts."'137 Most disturbing of all, some "ingenious
131. Kristen A. Carpenter et al., In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2009),
available at http://ssm.com/abstractid=1220665.
132. BROWN, supra note 126, at 27-28.
133. DRIPS, supra note 10, art. 12(1).
134. BROWN, supra note 126, at 28.
135. Working Group Study, supra note 50, 1 68.
136. Michael Blakeney, Protecting Expressions of Australian Aboriginal Folklore Under
Copyright Law, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 442, 442 (1995).
137. Long, supra note 124, at 243.
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people set up a town named 'Zuni' in the Philippines, then stamped goods with
the label 'Made in Zuni. ' '" 38
While traditional communities have sought courts' assistance in enjoining
others from making unauthorized reproduction of their materials, their cease-
and-desist demands are not always fruitful. For example, in the case of the
Australian aborigines, "[a]fter Australian tee-shirt companies were sued for
infringing the copyright of Aboriginal artists, they began to print shirts with fake
designs. 'Most tourists shops [therefore] ... are replete with examples of T-shirt
designs which may appear to be works of Aboriginal art but are in fact
caricatures of Aboriginal art.' ' 139 The resulting misrepresentation and distortion
have caused significant economic and psychological injuries to traditional
communities. As Michael Blakeney noted, "the unauthorised reproduction of
designs which are of significance to Aboriginal religious beliefs and cultural
identity is as damaging as the desecration, through mining, of traditional
dreaming places."1 40
To reduce abuse and unauthorized copying, trademarks-in particular
certification marks-have been used to ensure the authenticity and appropriate
use of traditional materials.141 Moral rights provide additional protection against
138. J. Michael Finger, Introduction and Overview, in POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE:
PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 17 (J. Michael Finger & Philip
Schuler eds., 2004) [hereinafter POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE].
139. BROWN, supra note 126, at 89 (quoting Colin Golvan, Aboriginal Art and the Protection of
Indigenous Cultural Rights, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 227,229 (1992)).
140. Blakeney, supra note 136, at 442.
141. As Wend Wendland observed,
In Australia, certification marks have been registered by the National Indigenous Arts
Advocacy Association. In Canada, trademarks, including certification marks, are used by
Aboriginal people to identify a wide range of goods and services, ranging from traditional art
and artwork to food products, clothing, tourist services, and enterprises run by First Nations.
Many Aboriginal businesses and organizations have registered trademarks relating to
traditional symbols and names. In Portugal, the Association of Carpet Producers of
Arraiolos has registered a collective trademark in respect of its products. And, in New
Zealand, the Maori Arts Board of Creative New Zealand is making use of trademark
protection through the development of the "Maori Made Mark." It is a trademark of
authenticity and quality, which indicates to consumers that the creator of goods is of Maori
descent and produces work of a particular quality. It is a response to concerns raised by
Maori regarding the protection of cultural and intellectual property rights, the misuse and
abuse of Maori concepts, styles, and imagery, and the lack of commercial benefits accruing
back to Maori.
Wend B. Wendland, Intellectual Property and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Cultural
Expressions, in ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE, supra note 42, at 327, 333; see also Maui Solomon,
Protecting Maori Heritage in New Zealand, in ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE, supra note 42, at 352,
355 (discussing the protection offered by the Maori Made Mark, "Toi Iho," which "licences Maori
artists to use the Mark to authenticate their works and provide consumers with quality assurance that
the products are made by genuine Maori artists and to distinguish them from the many 'copy-cat'




"debasement, mutilation or destruction" of traditional expressions. 142 Because
"[t]he absence of an authenticity mark [or proper attribution] would alert
potential consumers of cultural products to a lack of association with the
presumed source community,"' 143 these different forms of rights may enable
traditional communities to share in the benefits of their intangible cultural
heritage and obtain appropriate recognition for their creative contributions.
Although expectations for authenticity usually result in greater control by
traditional communities and more deference to them, such expectations
sometimes may backfire on the communities by making it more difficult for them
to demand the return of those cultural relics that are already taken from the
communities without their authorization. For instance, a museum can use
authenticity as a justification to reject demands by indigenous communities to
rebury human remains residing in the museum. 144
C. Recognition
An objective that goes hand in hand with the protection of authenticity
interests is the recognition of the contributions traditional communities have
made over the centuries. Such recognition can be achieved through the
introduction of greater control of their intangible cultural heritage, which in turn
would enable the communities to share in the benefits of the exploitation of such
heritage. The traditional communities' intangible cultural heritage can also be
recognized through a requirement to disclose the origins of the traditional
materials used in new creations or inventions. Proposals that seek to introduce a
disclosure requirement include Switzerland's recent proposal to amend the PCT
Regulations and a similar proposal by a group of less-developed countries to
amend the TRIPS Agreement. 145 To some extent, these requirements resemble
those ethical guidelines museums have used to ensure proper handling of
cultural relics. 146
142. Kamal Puri, Cultural Ownership and Intellectual Property Rights Post-Mabo: Putting Ideas
into Action, 9 INTELL. PROP. J. 293, 332 (1995).
143. SCAFIDI, supra note 70, at 66.
144. See Patty Gerstenblith, Cultural Significance and the Kennewick Skeleton: Some Thoughts on
the Resolution of Cultural Heritage Disputes, in CLAIMING THE STONES, supra note 117, at 162, 163.
See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the importance of authenticity.
145. Article 29bis Proposal, supra note 30, 2; Switzerland's PCT Proposal, supra note 26, 21.
For discussions of the advantages and disadvantages of the introduction of a disclosure requirement,
see generally JOSHUA D. SARNOFF & CARLOS M. CORREA, ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS FOR
IMPLEMENTING DISCLOSURE OF ORIGIN REQUIREMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
APPLICATIONS (2006), U.N. Doc. UNCTADDITCrIED2004/14, available at
http://www.unctad.orgrTEMPLATESIDownload.asp?docid=6819&lang=l&intltemlD=2094; Nuno
Pires de Carvalho, From the Shaman's Hut to the Patent Office: A Road Under Construction, in
BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW, supra note 42, at 241, 245; Dutfield, supra note 111, at 506-09.
146. See James A.R. Nafziger, The Principles for Cooperation in the Mutual Protection and
Transfer of Cultural Material, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 147, 151-52 (2007) (noting ethical guidelines developed
by University of Pennsylvania Museum that "insisted on a pedigree for every acquisition and on full
disclosure of details about the acquisition to the public" and that have been followed by other leading
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By identifying the source of the underlying materials, a disclosure
requirement would help users understand better the origin of the products while
providing recognition to the community responsible for the creation of those
materials) t47 Such a requirement would also enhance the ability of "providers of
genetic resources and TK to keep track of the use of their tangible and intangible
resources as well as the development resulting in patentable inventions."' 148
If informed consent is further mandated as part of the requirement, like
what is stated in the Article 29bis Proposal, 149 the requirement would further
ensure a legitimate exchange between traditional communities and follow-on
authors or inventors. Such consent is particularly important when the invention
includes genetic resources from traditional and indigenous peoples. Such a
requirement would also "increase transparency and help Developing Countries
to monitor actual compliance with the provisions [on access and benefit sharing]
set forth in the CBD.- 150
Moreover, the disclosure requirement would benefit the public at large by
informing the public of the origin of the underlying materials while at the same
time allowing them to anticipate potential issues that may arise as a result of
such usage. By disclosing in intellectual property applications the underlying
prior art, the requirement would also reduce the chance of privatization of pre-
existing traditional knowledge and genetic resources, 151 both of which will
remain in the public domain and be freely available to the public at large.
The requirement would also help strike a practical compromise that would
allow traditional communities to ensure authenticity, obtain recognition, and
share in the benefits amidst the rapid commodification of traditional cultural
expressions and continuous and expanding practice of bioprospecting. As
Christine Haight Farley wrote,
Assuming that the circulation of indigenous art is inevitable, some
indigenous artists want to be sure to participate in this celebration of
indigenous culture. By gaining control over the circulation of their
imagery, they want to ensure that the public gets an accurate account
museums, such as Metropolitan Museum of Art, Harvard University, Brooklyn Museum, Field
Museum of Natural History, and Smithsonian Institution).
147. Cf. Steven R. King, Establishing Reciprocity: Biodiversity, Conservation and New Models for
Cooperation Between Forest-Dwelling Peoples and the Pharmaceutical Industry, in IPR SOURCEBOOk,
supra note 115, at 69, 80 (noting that "one of the ongoing concerns of the indigenous community is not
only the financial credit but also the scientific and intellectual credit for their scientific discoveries and
achievements").
148. Arezzo, supra note 27, at 381.
149. Article 29bis Proposal, supra note 30, 1 2.
150. Arezzo, supra note 27, at 379; accord Dutfield, supra note 111, at 506-11 (noting that
disclosure requirement aims to "ensure[] that the resources and [traditional knowledge] were acquired
in accordance with biodiversity access and benefit sharing regulations in the source countries").
151. See Arezzo, supra note 27, at 381 (noting that disclosure requirement would facilitate
identification of prior art when evaluating inventions dealing with genetic resources and traditional
knowledge).
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of indigenous culture and that the investment in that culture goes back
to their communities. 152
Nevertheless, disclosure has a major weakness: because of the inherent
difficulty in determining the source of origin of the underlying materials, such a
requirement may lead to uncertainty and inconsistency and may ultimately
reduce incentives for creation and innovation. As Emanuela Arezzo explained,
Use of genetic resources is rarely recognizable by merely looking at the
final product. Even under a close analysis, indigenous people would
not know that biological resources had been taken without prior
informed consent, not to mention access and benefit sharing; the same
applies for TK. Only when the innovation consists of the very same use
of the plant that is known in the indigenous community is the link
between the biological resource and the patent apparent. Sometimes,
however, traditional scientific knowledge only provides useful leads
that "bioprospectors" use for prioritizing the screening of certain
plants. The isolated molecules and compounds of these plants may
reveal properties beyond those identified by indigenous communities,
or the properties already known by indigenous communities are
studied for new purposes. In the latter case, the link between TK and
the final product gets blurred along the way to the patent office, and
indigenous people are unable to find out about-and hence oppose-
biosquatting. 153
This difficulty is, indeed, one of the main reasons why the United States and
Japan strongly oppose the disclosure requirement proposals at both WIPO and
the WTO.1 54 Whether the requirement will be beneficial depends on whether the
benefits of disclosure exceed its costs. At this point, making that determination
will require further empirical research.
D. Compensation
In addition to recognition and authenticity, some traditional communities
want compensation. As this Part has shown, the use of traditional materials
without their authorization harms the communities in economic, social, cultural,
psychological, and spiritual terms. As a result, some communities have
demanded compensation for their injuries. To be certain, such compensation
may not fully cover those injuries. However, it does provide significant benefits
to the communities; at the very least, it can promote "local sustenance and
adequacy for living" for the traditional communities. 155
152. Farley, supra note 122, at 14.
153. Arezzo, supra note 27, at 379; see also AOKI, supra note 41, at 92 (noting difficulty in
obtaining meaningful informed consent as a result of the fact that "communities from whom consent is
sought are often fragmented and dynamic in composition over time rather than homogenous and
stable").
154. See Arezzo, supra note 27, at 387-88.
155. Stephen Gudeman, Sketches, Qualms, and Other Thoughts on Intellectual Property Rights, in
VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 102,
119 (Stephen B. Brush & Doreen Stabinsky eds., 1996).
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As Graham Dutfield reminded us, "TK is valuable first and foremost to
indigenous and local communities who depend upon it for their livelihoods and
well-being, as well as for enabling them to sustainably manage and exploit their
local ecosystems such as through sustainable low-input agriculture.' 1 56 Likewise,
Professor Brown suggested that we should reframe the question from "Who
owns native culture?" to "How can we promote respectful treatment of native
cultures and indigenous forms of self-expression within mass societies?"' 157
Taking account of the growing demands, Jerome Reichman developed a
proposal for using liability rules to address problems concerning the protection
of traditional knowledge and subpatentable inventions. 158 Under his proposed
compensatory liability scheme, second comers will be required "to pay equitable
compensation for borrowed improvements over a relatively short period of
time."'159 As Professor Reichman explained, such an alternative regime has
several benefits. For example, it "could stimulate investment without chilling
follow-on innovation and without creating legal barriers to entry.' 60 Such a
regime "would also go a long way toward answering hard questions about how to
protect applications of traditional biological and cultural knowledge to industry,
questions that are of increasing importance to developing and least-developed
countries."' 161
In recent years, Professor Reichman and his colleague, Tracy Lewis, have
further developed this proposal into one that uses liability rules to address
problems concerning the protection of traditional knowledge. 162 Their
compensatory liability regime would provide traditional communities with "a
clear entitlement to prevent wholesale duplication of their compiled information
and to reasonable compensation for all follow-on commercial applications of
their traditional knowledge during a specified period of time.' 63 The scheme
provides three distinct rights: "[1] a right to prevent wholesale duplication, [2] a
right to compensation from value-adding improvers, and [3] a right to make use
of a second comer's value-adding improvements for purposes of making further
improvements of his or her own." 16 Through protection of these rights, the
regime "would temporarily remove eligible traditional knowledge from the
limbo of a true public domain and relocate it to a semicommons, from which it
156. Dutfield, supra note 111, at 505.
157. BROWN, supra note 126, at 10.
158. J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable
Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1743, 1776-91 (2000).
159. Id. at 1777.
160. Id. at 1746.
161. Id. at 1747.
162. Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in
Developing Countries: Application to Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS,
supra note 111, at 337, 348-65.
163. Id. at 358-59.
164. Id. at 349.
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could freely be accessed and used for specified purposes, in return for the
payment of compensatory royalties for a specified period of time.'1 65
Notwithstanding these proposals, and similar proposals by other
policymakers and commentators, compensation can be difficult sometimes. For
example, as the previous section noted, detecting the use of genetic resources
can be difficult, time consuming, and technology intensive.166 Researchers may
also "find that a bioactive ingredient has a medical use different from that
suggested by the original collectors"; 167 such varied use "is by no means unusual
because traditional plant remedies may be effective within the framework of a
society's own understanding and yet fail to satisfy the efficacy standards of
Western medicine.' 168
Moreover, some communities would simply consider monetary
compensation inadequate. The continuing of cultural knowledge and practices is
important to the survival of the communities, 169 and it is hard to quantify cultural
erosion and community loss in monetary terms. As Antony Taubman, the former
acting director of WIPO's Traditional Knowledge Division, pointed out, "Where
certain uses cause spiritual offence and threaten cultural integrity,.., rather than
commercial damage, monetary payment may not be viewed by TK holders as...
an equitable form of compensation.' 170 Meanwhile, the survival of the
community is also important to the survival of culture and knowledge. 171 If the
community disappears, such important knowledge is also likely to become
extinct.
E. Benefit Sharing
A more conciliatory objective is to allow traditional communities and less-
developed countries to share in the benefits created through the use of their
intangible cultural heritage. Article 80) of the CBD, for example, requires
member states to
respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of
indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity
and promote their wider application with the approval and
involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and
165. Id. at 354-55.
166. See Arezzo, supra note 27, at 379 (explaining scientific process of detecting genetic resources
in products).
167. BROWN, supra note 126, at 111.
168. Id.
169. See Working Group Study, supra note 50,1 30.
170. Antony Taubman, Saving the Village: Conserving Jurisprudential Diversity in the
International Protection of Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note
111, at 521, 532.
171. See WIPO, IP & TK, supra note 117, at 7 (noting that "the very survival of the knowledge is
at stake, as the cultural survival of communities is under threat").
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practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising
from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices.172
The Article 29bis Proposal also requires the disclosure of information
concerning the compliance with the CBD's benefit-sharing requirement. 173
Taken together, these benefit-sharing arrangements would allow traditional
communities to capitalize on what Michael Finger and Philip Schuler have called
"poor people's knowledge."' 74 As noted in a study by the Department of
Canadian Heritage, the protection of traditional knowledge and cultural
expressions can be seen "as part of a development strategy."'175 By facilitating
the use and further development of this knowledge and these expressions, the
arrangements would also benefit nontraditional communities and the public at
large, especially if the protected materials can be clearly identified and such
protection would not incur significant transaction costs or result in what Michael
Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg have described as the "tragedy of the anti-
commons."
176
To maximize benefits from the arrangement, commentators have advocated
the use of property or intellectual property rights. By creating artificial scarcity
in the form of limited monopolies, similar to what is offered in the intellectual
property system, the exclusive rights model would enable traditional
communities to obtain a higher return on the use and exploitation of their
cultural materials.1 77 As Professor Daes reasoned,
A number of distinctively patterned textiles, such as ikat cloth from
Sulawesi and Zapotec rugs from Mexico have obtained large markets
in industrialized countries. These items can easily be reproduced at
lower cost on machines, however, and when produced in large
quantities they quickly lose their novelty and commercial value.
1 78
Notwithstanding these benefits, commentators have questioned whether
172. CBD, supra note 35, art. 8(j).
173. Article 29bis Proposal, supra note 30, 1 2.
174. See generally POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE, supra note 138.
175. SHINYA, supra note 130, at 24; accord WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL
CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS/FOLKLORE 12 (2002), available at http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/
en/tk/913/wipo pub_913.pdf [hereinafter WIPO, IP & TCE] (stating that "some communities wish to
gain and exercise IP in their tradition-based creations and innovations to enable them to exploit their
creations and innovations commercially as a contribution to their economic development").
176. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); see also Michael A. Heller, The
Tragedy ofthe Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REv. 621
(1998).
177. For discussions of the use of intellectual property rights to protect traditional knowledge
and cultural expressions, see generally INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE (Silke von Lewinski ed., 2d ed.,
2009); Daniel J. Gervais, Spiritual but Not Intellectual? The Protection of Sacred Intangible Traditional
Knowledge, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 467 (2003); Robert K. Paterson & Dennis S. Karjala,
Looking Beyond Intellectual Property in Resolving Protection of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of
Indigenous Peoples, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 633 (2003); Puri, supra note 142.
178. Working Group Study, supra note 50, 9 61.
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such a model would be ideal for the protection of intangible cultural heritage.1 79
For example, "indigenous peoples do not view their heritage in terms of property
at all . . . but in terms of community and individual responsibility. . . . For
indigenous peoples, heritage is a bundle of relationships, rather than a bundle of
economic rights." 180 Moreover, as Naomi Mezey noted recently,
[C]ultural property is contradictory in the very pairing of its core
concepts. Property is fixed, possessed, controlled by its owner, and
alienable. Culture is none of these things. Thus, cultural property
claims tend to fix culture, which if anything is unfixed, dynamic, and
unstable. They also tend to sanitize culture, which if it is anything is
human and messy, and therefore as ugly as it is beautiful, as destructive
as it is creative, as offensive as it is inspiring. 181
There is also a general "presumption that Western nations prefer private
ownership and source nations or indigenous peoples prefer group or common
ownership." 182 However, it is important to remember that not all traditional
objects are intended to be communal. As Professor Daes pointed out,
"[a]lthough heritage is communal, there is usually an individual who can best be
described as a custodian or caretaker of each song, story, name, medicine, sacred
place and other aspect of a people's heritage.1' 83 Moreover, as Michael Harkin
has shown, the "masks and ceremonial objects of the Kwakiutl, items associated
with the potlatch ritual, were not communal but intensely personal, having been
created for, and owned by, specific individuals."1 84 Many of the songs and dances
associated with this potlatch ritual, indeed, "are under the exclusive possession
and control of particular individuals."1 85 Exclusive possession and control can
also be found in "some of the songs of the Suydi, or the sacred objects of the
Australian Aboriginal people." 186
Most recently, Kristen Carpenter, Sonia Katyal, and Angela Riley made a
very convincing case that the property model has its merits.1 87 As they explained,
it is not the property model per se that creates problems for the protection of
179. For criticisms of the use of a property model for the protection of traditional knowledge, see
generally BROWN, supra note 126; Mezey, supra note 9.
180. Working Group Study, supra note 50, 1 26.
181. Mezey, supra note 9, at 2005.
182. Harding, supra note 50, at 304.
183. Working Group Study, supra note 50, 1 29.
184. Sarah Harding, Defining Traditional Knowledge-Lessons from Cultural Property, 11
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 511, 516 (2003) (citing Michael Harkin, Privacy, Ownership and the
Repatriation of Cultural Properties: An Ethnographic Perspective from the Northwest Coast 5 (2001)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Sarah Harding)).
185. Harding, supra note 50, at 306 (footnote omitted).
186. Id. (footnote omitted); see also Candace S. Greene & Thomas D. Drescher, The Tipi with
Battle Pictures: The Kiowa Tradition of Intangible Property Rights, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 418, 427-33
(1994) (describing recognition by the Kiowa tribe of "a warrior's ownership of the story of his deeds,
as well as individual ownership of songs, formal names, tipi designs, and beadwork patterns" and
explaining how their treatment of these objects differs from that under Western law).




intangible cultural heritage, but rather the undue focus on ownership and the
rights to exclude, develop, and transfer that makes the model undesirable.1 88 To
remedy this misguided focus, they articulated a new property model that is based
on a stewardship paradigm. 189 As they explained, such a model would take
account of the indigenous communities' collective obligations toward land and
resources.
190
Their proposed model makes a lot of sense. Stewardship has long been used
as a key justification for the protection of intangible cultural heritage.1 91 In
addition, the property model based on a stewardship paradigm would not
necessarily result in exclusion, alienation, and transfer-some of the main
concerns of traditional communities. Nevertheless, there may be questions
concerning how broadly stewardship should be defined. As Barry Barclay noted,
Each generation has a part in . . .stewardship. Having taken a
storyteller position, I could show a great range of people who are
involved in this stewardship, from the home gardener, the peasant
farmer and the traditional plant breeder to the international policy
maker; anybody, in fact, who is involved in the stewardship of the
plants humans depend upon for life itself. For my money, that involves,
to a greater or lesser extent, each one of us. But while the term
'stewardship' provides a useful context within which to place this or
that aspect of our management responsibilities, it does not formally
front up on the tough question: who owns the seed? 'A private or
public resource?' Pat Mooney asks.' 92
In addition to the use of property rights, benefit sharing can be arranged
through the use of knowledge transfer and research collaborative agreements. 93
The innovative approach taken by the Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad
("INBio") in Costa Rica, for example, provides a leading example of the
successful use of these agreements. The agreements allow companies like Merck
to collect biological samples in conservatories set up in Costa Rica and conduct
research and develop commercial products based on those samples in exchange
for advance payment and royalties in those products. 194 To date, INBio has been
quite successful. As one commentator noted, it "has signed more than 20




191. See BARRY BARCLAY, MANA TUTURU: MAORI TREASURES AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 44-45 (2005).
192. Id.
193. For discussion of bioprospecting arrangements with cooperation between the North and the
South, see generally Djaja Djendoel Soejarto et al., Bioprospecting Arrangements: Cooperation
Between the North and the South, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND
AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 1511 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds.,
2007) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK]; Carl-Gustaf Thornstrom
& Lars Bj6rk, Access and Benefit Sharing: Illustrated Procedures for the Collection and Importation of
Biological Materials, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, supra, at 1469.
194. See G~mez, supra note 42, at 82-83.
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represent an investment of US$0.5 million per year for bioprospecting activities
and US$0.5 million per year for capacity building, technology transfer and
institutional empowerment."
195
In sum, there are a number of ways to allow traditional communities to
share in the benefits of the exploitation of their intangible cultural heritage. Two
problems remain, however. First, the establishment of benefit-sharing
arrangements assumes that traditional materials can be freely commodified. This
is not true with respect to materials that are sacred or intended to be kept
secret. 196 Second, and more importantly, there is no guarantee that the proceeds
from the benefit-sharing arrangement will go directly to traditional communities.
Many less-developed countries remain troubled by rampant corruption and
inadequate infrastructure.197 As a result, the revenues that are generated through
the use of intangible cultural heritage may never reach the hands of the
traditional communities.
Indeed, commentators have been particularly concerned about the potential
claims on revenues by government mediator agencies. As Tom Greaves wrote,
"all of the countries with significant indigenous societies have government
mediator agencies to deal with them [and serve as the authorized guardians of
their welfare]. . . . Would [the earned revenues] by-pass these intermediate
organizations?' '198 Likewise, Professor Brown questioned, "Who are legitimate
representatives of indigenous peoples in negotiations with foreign
bioprospectors? Can the state speak for them, or must they be allowed to speak
for themselves?' ' 199 To avoid diversion, some companies, like Shaman
Pharmaceuticals, have chosen "not . . . to return royalties directly to source
communities but to a Northern-run NGO that will distribute the proceeds as it
sees fit."'20
To make things even gloomier and more complicated, there is a historical
lack of respect and representation for, and participation of, traditional
195. Id. at 83-84.
196. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of cultural privacy.
197. As Professor Heald noted,
The problem with creating markets for knowledge of plant genetic resources is especially
acute when corrupt local and national governments are unwilling to facilitate transactions
with their least powerful constituents. In the developing world, we see a pattern of
dislocation, destruction of homeland, and a preference for logging and commercial farming
interests that threaten both biodiversity and the very existence of long-term occupant
communities. Governmental antagonism to these communities complicates transactions with
them. Even where official policy is benign, institutionalized bribery and the lack of a reliable
judiciary make establishing a flourishing market difficult. Bureaucratic impediments to bio-
prospecting may make it entirely unprofitable.
Heald, supra note 124, at 536.
198. Greaves, supra note 115, at 12.
199. BROWN, supra note 126, at 112.
200. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 125, at 961.
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communities in the political process.201 This is true with respect to communities
in both the developed and less-developed worlds. As Professor Coombe noted,
Although indigenous peoples are now recognized as key actors in this
global dialogue, it will need to be expanded to encompass a wider
range of principles and priorities, which will eventually encompass
political commitments to indigenous peoples' rights of self-
determination. Only when indigenous peoples are full partners in this
dialogue, with full juridical standing and only when . . .their cultural
world views, customary laws, and ecological practices are recognized as
fundamental contributions to resolving local social justice concerns will
we be engaged in anything we can genuinely call a dialogue.2°2
Indeed, Keith Aoki reminded us that it is not difficult to "imagine situations
where the interests of subnational groups, communities or tribes are at
loggerheads with state interests."20 3
Notwithstanding these political challenges, it is important not to overstate
the disconnect between national governments and traditional communities. As
Paul Kuruk reminded us,
Most Africans belong to tribes and have roots in traditional
communities, whether they live in villages or cities. The lowest rural
shepherd boy is no more a traditionalist than is the President of the
country living in the state capital. Also, tribal groups are as much a part
of the national government as any group could possibly be. As such,
they are not minority groups fighting for political power. That central
governments in Africa are not threatened politically may explain why
they have readily acknowledged in legislation the entitlement of
traditional groups to their folklore. 204
201. See SCAFIDI, supra note 70, at 56 (stating that "[b]y nature, cultural products develop
through community participation over time" and that "[i]t would be incongruous to recognize as
authentic only those frozen at a particular moment").
202. Rosemary J. Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' and Community Traditional
Knowledge in International Law, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 275, 284-85 (2001); accord Greaves, supra
note 115, at 14 ("In most African states, ... the larger tribal societies sees [sic] themselves as rightful
elements of the nation's government. Owning their cultural knowledge is not the issue, owning a share
of the central government is."); see also AOKI, supra note 41, at 107 (noting "internal disparities
between ruling elites and traditional communities"); Dean B. Suagee, The Cultural Heritage of
American Indian Tribes and the Preservation of Biological Diversity, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 483, 488 (1999)
(noting that "[tjhe most effective way to make use of their traditional ecological knowledge is to
recognize the rights of indigenous peoples to govern their own territories").
203. AOKI, supra note 41, at 92; accord Alexander A. Bauer, New Ways of Thinking About
Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade Debates, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 690,
703 (2008) (noting that "[miany countries contain minority communities whose interests are not
always served by their national governments").
204. Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modem Intellectual Property Regimes: A Reappraisal
of the Tensions Between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the United States, 48 AM. U. L.
REV. 769, 841 (1999); accord Hammer Jersen, Who Owns Traditional Knowledge? A Personal and
Industry View, in ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE, supra note 42, at 340, 341 (stating that "indigenous
peoples are the majority" in most countries).
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Benedict Kingsbury also found the concept of "indigenous people" somewhat
problematic in Southeast Asia, due partly to its colonial history. 20
5
F. Conservation
The objective to conserve intangible cultural heritage is quite different from
some of the other underlying objectives discussed in this Article. This objective
benefits not only traditional communities and less-developed countries, but also
nontraditional communities and developed countries. Preservation and
conservation, indeed, provide the main objectives of the protection for cultural
relics. As Professor Merryman noted,
The essential ingredient of any cultural property policy is that the
object itself be physically preserved. The point is too obvious to need
elaboration; if it is lost or destroyed, the Etruscan sarcophagus or the
Peruvian textile or the Chinese pot cannot be studied, enjoyed, or
used. Everything else depends on the physical survival of the cultural
artifact itself. Indeed, from a certain point of view the observation is
tautological; if we don't care about its preservation, it isn't, for us, a
cultural object.20 6
Thus, many consider cultural relics as "survivors. ' ' 2° As such, they "play[]
an integral role in characterizing and expressing the shared identity and essence
of a community, a people and a nation. Cultural property tells people who they
are and where they come from." 208 Different people have different ways to
"live[] their lives and order[] their values. [Because elvery human society
manages to place its unique stamp on its artifacts ... [cultural relics] reveal
something essential about itself. ' ' 2°9
Like the protection of cultural relics, conservation is a very important
objective of the protection for intangible cultural heritage. Unlike the protection
of tangible objects, however, the conservation of such heritage focuses mainly on
205. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Applicability of the International Legal Concept of "Indigenous
Peoples" in Asia, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 336 (Joanne R. Bauer &
Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999) (arguing concept of "indigenous peoples" has roots in European colonial
settlement and is inapplicable in parts of Asia not exposed to European settlement).
206. Merryman, supra note 60, at 355. Likewise, Roger Mastalir wrote,
Preservation is the first principle of protection of cultural property because if cultural
property is destroyed the source nations or peoples, as well as the world heritage at large,
are divested of valuable objects. Destruction makes any question of allocation moot.
Deterioration, vandalism, and accidental damage also diminish the nation's and the world's
cultural resources.
Roger W. Mastalir, A Proposal for Protecting the "Cultural" and "Property" Aspects of Cultural
Property Under International Law, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1033, 1045 (1993).
207. Merryman, supra note 60, at 347.
208. Stephanie 0. Forbes, Comment, Securing the Future of Our Past: Current Efforts to Protect
Cultural Property, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 235,241-42 (1996) (footnote omitted).
209. Merryman, supra note 60, at 353; see also Harding, supra note 184, at 512 (recounting that
when Cape Fox Pole was returned to Tlingit people, "a member of the Cape Fox community
commented, '[tihese things contain our tribal history, tell us who we really are. These things will make
our grandchildren proud of who they are."').
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the materials-whether they are physical, cultural, biological-as compared to
cultures themselves. As Naomi Mezey reminded us, "[w]e humans should save
species not because of the interest each species has in its own survival, but for
the sake of diversity and the contribution of each species to a diversified global
ecosystem. " 210
Commentators have expressed concern about the ecological impact of
increased intellectual property protection. As one commentator noted, one of
the key ecological impacts of the TRIPS Agreement is "[t]he spread of
monocultures as corporations with IPRs attempt to maximize returns on
investments by increasing market shares." 211 To highlight the danger of a lack of
biodiversity, commentators have retold stories about "the Irish potato famine
during the 1840s and the Southern Corn Leaf Blight during the 1970s. ' '212 Jack
Kloppenburg also pointed out that "none of the world's twenty most important
food crops is indigenous to North America or Australia... [and that] it is clearly
the West Central Asiatic and Latin American regions whose germplasm
resources have historically made the largest genetic contribution to feeding the
world., 213
To date, the less-developed South possesses far richer biodiversity than the
developed North. As Chidi Oguamanam observed,
The richness of biodiversity in the tropical South can be captured
from few samples. A single leguminous tree in Peru harbours forty-
three species of ants, almost the same as the entire ant population in
Great Britain. Costa Rica has an estimated fifteen hundred to two
thousand butterfly species. Britain has about sixty, even though Costa
Rica constitutes less than one-sixth of the British land area. To
physical/zoological geographers and conservation biologists, the whole
of Europe is but a small fragment compared to Asia in terms of
diversity of animal life. All the tree species in North America are equal
to just seven hundred species of trees in ten selected one-hectare plots
in Borneo. The Cape Florist Peninsula in South Africa, which is only
470 square kilometres in area, is home to over two thousand
indigenous species, a greater number than the entire flora species of
Eastern North America. A square-kilometre of the forests of Central
or South America contains a legendary collection running into
hundreds of assorted species.214
Sadly, the international system operates in the opposite direction: the
wealth of a country is usually inversely proportional to the richness of its
biodiversity. Because the market offers limited value to traditional materials and
biological resources, the South was unable to convert their biological wealth to
210. Mezey, supra note 9, at 2010.
211. Scott Holwick, Comment, Developing Nations and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
ofIntellectual Property Rights, 11 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY (1999 YEARBOOK) 49,58 (2000).
212. AOKI, supra note 41, at 24.
213. JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT
BIOTECHNOLOGY, 1492-2000, at 181 (1988).
214. OGUAMANAM, supra note 37, at 39-40 (footnotes omitted).
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economic development. To add insult to the injury, the biodiversity-poor
countries "are now exporting wheat, corn, and rice to the very nations in which
those crops originated"-at high prices at times.215 In view of this inequitable
arrangement, less-developed countries are now demanding reform that reflects
their contributions and takes account of their local conditions. 216 They also seek
greater financial resources from developed countries to help conserve biological
resources.
Fortunately, as Paul Heald suggested, conservation of natural resources
may provide common ground for developed and less-developed countries,
traditional and nontraditional communities, and corporations and individuals to
work together. As he explained, "[p]reservation is in the direct financial interest
of some of the most powerful private institutions on the earth-international
pharmaceutical, agribusiness and bio-tech firms-and it is worth convincing
them to support the effort. '217 Indeed, conservation would help create "ethnic
externalities" that may benefit the entire world-both in the cultural and
biological sense.2 18
While conservation benefits all humanity, including both traditional and
nontraditional communities, conservation provides additional benefits to
traditional communities. In some cases, conservation may even be needed to
enable these communities to survive. As the United Kingdom Commission on
Intellectual Property Rights ("IPR Commission") reminded us,
Traditional knowledge has played, and still plays, a vital role in the
daily lives of the vast majority of people. Traditional knowledge is
essential to the food security and health of millions of people in the
developing world. In many countries, traditional medicines provide the
only affordable treatment available to poor people. In developing
countries, up to 80% of the population depend on traditional
medicines to help meet their healthcare needs. In addition, knowledge
of the healing properties of plants has been the source of many modern
medicines.219
According to Professor Coombe, "most of the worlds' poorest people depend
upon their traditional environmental, agricultural, and medicinal knowledge for
their continuing survival, given their marginalization from market economies
and the inability of markets to meet their basic needs of social reproduction."
220
215. KLOPPENBURG, supra note 213, at 274.
216. See Yu, supra note 104, at 381-92.
217. Heald, supra note 124, at 538.
218. See Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriation of Native American Cultural Property, 72 IND.
L.J. 723,747 (1997) (discussing "ethnic externalities").
219. COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 73 (2002) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter IPR COMMISSION REPORT]; accord Suagee, supra
note 202, at 488 (noting that "[b]ecause tribal cultures are rooted in the natural world, protecting the
land and its biological communities tends to be a prerequisite for cultural survival").
220. Rosemary J. Coombe, Protecting Traditional Environmental Knowledge and New Social
Movements in the Americas: Intellectual Property, Human Right, or Claims to an Alternative Form of




An objective that is often mentioned along with conservation is access.
Access is important to scientific research. The need for access by the scientific
and museum communities, however, has created significant tension with the
interests of traditional communities. A notable example concerns the discovery
of what traditional communities have called the "Ancient One," but what the
popular press and many commentators have dubbed the "Kennewick Man"-a
label derived from Kennewick, Washington, the town near which the skeleton
was found.221 As Sarah Harding described,
In the summer of 1996, two men came across the remains of a
human skeleton lying in the Columbia River. After a brief
investigation, a group of anthropologists made two tentative findings.
First, the skeletal remains were that of a Caucasian and could not be
assigned to any Native American tribe living in the area. Second, the
skeletal remains were approximately 9000 years old. The age and
location of the remains led the Army Corps of Engineers to assume
they were associated with local Native American tribes and to send out
a notice of intent to repatriate the remains in accordance with
NAGPRA [Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
of 1990]. Numerous tribes in the area subsequently laid claim to the
remains, now known as the Kennewick Man, named after the town
near where he was discovered. At least two of the tribes claiming the
remains, the Umatilla and the Nez Perce, announced that they would
not permit scientific research on the remains prior to reburial. Shortly
after the publication of the notice of intent and before actual
repatriation, a group of scientists filed suit in federal district court
claiming, among other things, the right to perform tests on the remains
to determine whether the skeleton is Native American within the
meaning of NAGPRA. The scientists were subsequently joined in their
lawsuit by the Asatru Folk Assembly, a pre-Christian, European
religion, which sought custody of the remains on the basis of the
alleged European descent of the remains for the purpose of scientific
study and reburial in accordance with their religious beliefs. 222
After eight years, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
finally decided that the approximately 9,000-year-old remains did not fall within
the scope of NAGPRA.223 Because the remains were not culturally affiliated
with any legitimate claimant, the court did not order the remains to be
repatriated and permitted scientific research on the skeleton. 224
221. See Allison M. Dussias, Kennewick Man, Kinship, and the "Dying Race": The Ninth Circuit's
Assimilationist Assault on the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 84 NEB. L.
REV. 55, 131-33 (2005) (discussing disagreement between indigenous communities and popular press
over how to name skeleton). For discussions of the "Ancient One," or the "Kennewick Man," see
generally id.; Gerstenblith, supra note 144, at 163-67; S. Alan Ray, Native American Identity and the
Challenge of Kennewick Man, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 89 (2006).
222. Harding, supra note 50, at 349 (footnotes omitted).
223. Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 882 (9th Cir. 2004).
224. Id. The remains are now deposited at the Burke Museum at the University of Washington.
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While scientists and archaeologists tend to place higher values on research
and discoveries than cultural privacy and respect, 225 it is hard to ignore the fact
that these value-laden decisions tend to privilege the nontraditional worldview
over the traditional one. As Rebecca Tsosie pointed out, "The complex world
views [to which traditional communities subscribe] . .. encompass radically
different notions of life, death, kinship and cultural continuity, and suggest that
the scientific proof standard is a complete mismatch for Native American claims
to ancient remains. Science is incapable of demonstrating what Kennewick
Man's 'culture' was." 226 It is therefore no surprise that the International Society
of Ethnobiology stated as one of its guiding principles that scientists and
researchers should have a duty "to ensure that their research and activities have
minimum impact on local communities. '227  After all, the controversy
surrounding the Ancient One, or the Kennewick Man, is one "about whether the
self-definition of a Native American group should be recognized even when it
conflicts with the scientific interests of the dominant cultural and political group
in the United States." 228
The reburial of human remains of indigenous peoples, indeed, has sparked
significant controversies and concerns amongst the indigenous, scientific, and
museum communities. 229 It has also raised questions about whether indigenous
peoples should be treated differently.2 30 With the assistance provided by the
NAGPRA, 23t indigenous communities have begun to insist on the return of all
Burke Museum of Natural History and Culture, University of Washington, Kennewick Man on Trial,
http://www.washington.edu/burkemuseum/kman/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
225. See Neil Brodie, An Archaeologist's View of the Trade in Unprovenanced Antiquities, in ART
AND CULTURAL HERITAGE, supra note 42, at 52, 52 (stating that "[iln the past... archaeologists have
taken a rather proprietorial view of archaeological heritage, believing that their scientific methods and
objective research strategies have privileged their claim").
226. Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging Claims to the Past: Ancient Human Remains and Contemporary
Cultural Values, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 583, 640 (1999). Nevertheless, it is important not to assume all
traditional knowledge will be unscientific. As Graham Dutfield explained,
Even if these differentiations were completely reliable, one should not conclude that TK
is inherently unscientific. Johnson's findings confirm that a great deal of traditional
environmental knowledge is empirical and systematic, and therefore scientific. Further
support for the view that TK is scientific comes from anthropologists and other academics
that use the ethnoscience approach to studying TK relating to nature, and treat this
knowledge as being divisible into western scientific fields.
Dutfield, supra note 111, at 500 (footnote omitted).
227. Posey, supra note 117, at 214.
228. Gerstenblith, supra note 144, at 178.
229. For a provocative account of the effort by a young Inuit man and his tribe to rebury the
human remains of his father displayed in the American Museum of Natural History in New York, see
KENN HARPER, GtvE ME MY FATHER'S BODY: THE LIFE OF MINIK THE NEW YORK ESKIMO
(Steerforth Press 2000) (1986).
230. Thanks to Angela Riley for reminding me of this point.
231. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2006).
The Act "instructs federal agencies and museums receiving federal funds to identify the origin and
cultural affiliation of Native American cultural items and then to expeditiously return some of them to
culturally-affiliated Indian tribes." Harding, supra note 218, at 723.
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the human remains that are still housed in museums or research institutions. 232
As one commentator noted, "[m]ost of the tribes believe that if you rob the dead
... it disturbs the spirit and visits harm upon not only those who disturbed the
grave, but on the relatives of the dead, who allowed that to happen." 233 Likewise,
Professor Harding reminded us that "the Kumeyaay believe that if the remains
of an ancestor are disturbed, the spirit returns from the afterworld and remains
in pain until the remains are again returned to the earth. '"234 By contrast, many
museums believe that the retention of the remains is needed both for research
purposes and for meeting their patrons' general expectation of authenticity.
235
Scientists, understandably, also place high values on research, which they claim
will benefit all humanity, including both traditional and nontraditional
communities. 236
Another example that illustrates well the tension between access and
control concerns the potentially destructive practices of some traditional
communities-such as the Zunis' treatment of their Ahayu:da237 and the Igbo
people's neglect of their mbaris.238 Ahayuda, the Zuni War Gods, "are carved
wooden figures which are left in specific places in the mountains for ritual
232. See Gerstenblith, supra note 144, at 162-63 (recounting Paho Society's demand for
museum's release of remains of 18,000 Native American skeletons).
233. Vicki Quade, Who Owns the Past?: How Native American Indian Lawyers Fight for Their
Ancestors' Remains and Memories, HUM. RTS., Winter 1989-1990, at 24, 29 (quoting Walter Echo-
Hawk, an advocate for repatriation).
234. Harding, supra note 218, at 765.
235. See Gerstenblith, supra note 144, at 162-63 (discussing one museum's policy behind
insistence on retaining real bones rather than their reproductions).
236. See Merryman, supra note 60, at 359 (noting that "[t]ruth about the culture is, in its way, as
important to humanity as truth of other kinds-as scientific truth, for example").
237. As one commentator described,
The war gods of the Zuni people, a Native American tribe of the southwestern United
States, are carved wooden idols usually two or three feet tall. These Ahayu:da (ah-ha-YOO-
dah), carved by the tribe's Bear clan, appear to be simple, rather abstract faces. The objects
are rare because the clan only carves two per year. The commercial market for these
sculptures sets their value between U.S.$5,000 and U.S.$10,000....
... The Ahayu:da were placed in a shrine where their powers were invoked to protect the
tribe. Each Ahayu:da serves as guardian for the tribe until relieved by a new one. The older
ones must remain in place, contributing their strength until they decay and return to the
earth. The war gods are meant to be exposed to the weather so that they can do their work
as religious objects. Disintegration under the force of the elements is necessary to their
function. Although they can exist as objects, as property, when displayed in a museum, they
cannot serve their cultural purpose.
Mastalir, supra note 206, at 1038 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of Zuni War Gods and their
repatriation, see generally William L. Merrill et al., The Return of the Ahayu:da" Lessons for
Repatriation from Zuni Pueblo and the Smithsonian Institution, 34 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 523
(1993); William L. Merrill & Richard E. Ahlborn, Zuni Archangels and Ahayu:da: A Sculpted
Chronicle of Power and Identity, in ExHIBITING DILEMMAS: ISSUES OF REPRESENTATION AT THE
SMITHSONIAN 176 (Amy Henderson & Adrienne L. Kaeppler eds., 1997).
238. For a discussion of Igbo mbaris, see generally HERBERT M. COLE, MBARI: ART AND LIFE
AMONG THE OWERRI IGBO (1982).
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purposes." 239 As Professor Harding noted, "the most respectful treatment [of
these War Gods may be] destruction or neglect. '240 Removing them, therefore, is
not only considered theft and sacrilege, but may rob the War Gods of their
powers.241 Putting these statues in a museum also would deeply disturb the
Zunis, and perhaps other traditional communities, creating cultural discomfort,
psychological distress, and even spiritual harm.242 As Professor Harding
explained,
Violating the wishes and needs of Native American tribes with respect
to their cultural property neither helps the non-Indian population
understand Indian cultures nor assists in creating a sense of connection.
This notion of a common heritage [as embraced by many museums] is
at best an amorphous idea and at its worst an excuse to impose a
museum-going culture on an often not-so-receptive Indian population.
It is more often than not an easy excuse to put our own Western
educational, scientific, and artistic demands over and above the
interests and integrity of another culture .... Our common heritage is,
if anything, our ability to appreciate the beauty and integrity of
another culture and so it should be with an eye on preserving cultural
integrity that we go about understanding and dealing with cultural
property.243
Equally problematic is the seemingly counterintuitive practice of the Igbo
people in Nigeria: they developed artfully created structures but ignored, and
sometimes destroyed, them after completing their creations. Many
conservationists are likely to find their practice shocking, partly because of the
aesthetic appeal of the mbaris and partly because of the wasteful nature of the
practice. Some well-intentioned ones may even offer to "rescue" and "protect"
these mbaris-perhaps by relocating them to a museum for public display.
However, as Professor Harding explained,
Indigenous peoples ... tend to place greater emphasis on intangibles
and process .... The Igbo intentionally destroy or neglect their artfully
created structures to ensure the vitality of the urge to recreate: "The
purposeful neglect of the painstakingly and devoutly accomplished
mbari houses with all their art objects in them as soon as the primary
mandate of their creation has been served, provides a significant
insight into the Igbo aesthetic value as process rather than product.
Process is motion while product is rest. When the product is preserved
or venerated, the impulse to repeat the process is compromised."'244
239. Harding, supra note 218, at 746 n.118; accord Bauer, supra note 203, at 701 (noting that Zuni
War Gods "are meant to disintegrate among the elements in order to maintain balance in their lives").
240. Harding, supra note 218, at 771.
241. Id. at 746 n.118; see also Walter R. Echo-Hawk, Museum Rights vs. Indian Rights: Guidelines
for Assessing Competing Legal Interests in Native Cultural Resources, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 437, 445 (1986) (stating that "removal of [war god] from its original shrine on the reservation
was... unauthorized and illegal").
242. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of cultural privacy.
243. Harding, supra note 218, at 769.
244. Harding, supra note 50, at 309-10 (quoting James Clifford, Objects and Selves, in OBJECTS
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Indeed, their practice is quite different from the approach taken by
nontraditional communities, which have a tendency to collect, or even hoard,
cultural objects. As Professor Harding explained further,
Collecting nations choose to reify the objects themselves, placing them
in hermetically sealed display cases, whereas in many instances, source
nations and indigenous peoples desire to preserve the spirit of the
object over the object itself. Often the destruction, neglect, or seclusion
of the object is, in fact, central to the preservation of the spirit, as is the
case with the mbari house of the Igbo and the Zuni War Gods.
245
Interestingly, such destruction is not limited to traditional communities. For
example, as shown in Eastern Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall and
recently in Iraq following the removal of Saddam Hussein, "[t]hose who
overthrow regimes often take as one of their first tasks the physical destruction
of symbols-and the latent power possessed by these markers-of those whom
they have displaced. ' '246 As Eric Posner noted, "[o]ne might try to rely on
objective aesthetic or scholarly criteria applied by experts, but one could hardly
have demanded that Polish or Hungarian citizens not tear down aesthetically
valuable statues of communists while permitting them to tear down the
aesthetically objectionable statues." 247 Professor Harding also reminded us that
"cultural heritage has great potential as both propaganda and as 'a hedge against
ideological totalism."' 248
Outside the cultural property context, one could also find a growing amount
of literature discussing the decision by artists to destroy what they have
AND OTHERS: ESSAYS ON MUSEUMS AND MATERIAL CULTURE 236, 241 (George W. Stocking, Jr. ed.,
1985)). Herbert Cole described the mbari process as follows:
As a major festival only held at long intervals, mbari is capital entertainment for Owerri
people. The process is high drama: perhaps ten years of crescendo, a hundred costumed
actors, a mysterious setting, an unfolding, developing spectacle. It is a unified theatrical
presentation created for three audiences: the gods, the people inside the fence, the
community at large. . . . When an mbari is opened, it is no longer highly charged with
spiritual power: it is now a public monument. The sacrifice has been presented and accepted;
since this fundamental purpose has been served, the mbari is never repaired. In the old days
it was permissible to replace worn-out roofing mats, but never could crumbling, rain-washed
figures be repaired or repainted.
COLE, supra note 238, at 193, 198. See generally id. at 184-98 for a discussion of the mbari process.
245. Harding, supra note 50, at 312.
246. SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITrEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 12
(1998).
247. Posner, supra note 105, at 222.
248. Harding, supra note 50, at 330 (quoting Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV.
73, 97 (1996)); see also Hamilton, supra, at 96-101 (providing examples to illustrate destabilizing
potential of art and relationship between art censorship and totalitarian regimes); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 253-
57 (1998) (discussing how the commercial media help "undermine authoritarian rule by providing a




created.249 In a recent article, Lior Strahilevitz showed that such requests are
actually not unusual. 250 As he explained,
A society that does not allow authors to have their draft works
destroyed posthumously could have less literary product than a society
that requires the preservation of all literary works not destroyed during
the author's life. Protecting authors' rights to destroy should encourage
high-risk, high-reward projects, and might prevent writers from
worrying that they should not commit words to paper unless they have
complete visions of the narrative structures for their work. 251
Likewise, Joseph Sax believes "[a]n artist should be entitled to decide how the
world will remember him or her. '252
In fact, the right of withdrawal, which allows authors to withdraw their work
from public dissemination, and to subsequently destroy it in private, remains one
of the more controversial rights within a moral rights regime.253 As Linda Lacey
asked, "Who should prevail,... when an artist's will orders the destruction of
her paintings and an art expert challenges the will, declaring that the paintings
are masterpieces that would become an integral part of the culture of the artist's
homeland?" 254 Professor Lacey drew her example from Franz Kafka, who asked
his executor and friend, Max Brod, to destroy all of his unpublished works upon
his death-including two of his masterpieces that had not yet been published,
The Castle and The Trial.255 Fortunately, "Brod did not do so, thus preserving for
the public work which is widely acknowledged as being highly influential in
modern Western literature. '" 256
Finally, commentators have expressed concern that greater protection-in
the form of property rights perhaps-would reduce access to traditional
materials. Such concerns are unlikely to be justified, except in cases where the
protective regime includes in situ protection that restricts access of the
communities to a plant or a site. As Dennis Karjala noted,
The patent may ... mean that the price everywhere is higher than it
would be were the product available without patent protection. It
remains a fair question, however, whether the improved product would
exist at all but for the patent incentive. We must bear in mind that no
one is forced to buy the new product. Everyone is free to continue using
249. See, e.g., JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 198-201 (1999) (discussing decision by creators to destroy own
works); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 830-35 (2005) (elaborating
on justifications for rights of authors to destroy own works).
250. See Strahilevitz, supra note 249, at 831 (discussing famous examples of authors' desire to
destroy their works).
251. Id. at 832.
252. SAX, supra note 249, at 200.
253. The Berne Convention, for example, does not protect the right of withdrawal. It includes
only two moral rights: the right of attribution and the right of integrity. Berne Convention, supra note
84, art. 6bis(1).
254. Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1593-94.
255. Id. at 1594 n.263; Strahilevitz, supra note 249, at 830-31.
256. Lacey, supra note 254, at 1594 n.263.
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whatever he or she has used in the past. Those who do choose to buy
patented seed, for example, presumably believe that the higher seed
cost is more than compensated by the beneficial improvements brought
about by the newer product.2 57
Although Professor Karjala focused on patents, his arguments apply equally well
to other forms of intellectual property or sui generis rights. As he concluded,
"[T]he harmful influences of western life style for indigenous cultures are serious
and real. Unfortunately, they will not be ameliorated by what would inevitably
be minor adjustments to patent law in western countries or in locales of
traditional cultures." 258
Theory, however, sometimes differs from practice. For example, the issued
patents and plant variety protection certificates may be overbroad and therefore
may cover traditional knowledge that should be considered unprotectable prior
art. In the United States and other developed countries, for example, there have
been wide and intense discussions about the poor quality of the patent
examination process. 259 There have also been successful challenges by traditional
communities and indigenous groups to patents that have been wrongfully issued
to preexisting traditional knowledge. 260 Indeed, because of a lack of
documentation for traditional knowledge and the difficulty in determining
whether an invention has used such pre-existing knowledge, commentators have
proposed to introduce a disclosure requirement in the patent application
procedure.2 61
By expanding rights and protecting them aggressively, the intellectual
property system sometimes may also lead to unintended consequences that can
affect the ability by traditional communities to exploit their knowledge and
practices. For example, commentators have noted the confusion among United
States customs officials over whether it is legal for Mexican farmers to import
into the United States naturally grown yellow beans that have been native to
Mexico since perhaps the time of the Aztecs. 262 Such confusion, which has
resulted in significantly reduced bean exports from Mexico to the United
257. Dennis S. Karjala, Biotechnology Patents and Indigenous Peoples, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 193, at 1437, 1440 (emphasis added).
258. Id. at 1442.
259. For discussions of the problems within the United States patent system, see generally A
PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004); FED. TRADE COMM'N,
To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY
(2003), available at http:/lwww.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/lnnovationrpt.pdf; ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER,
INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING
INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2004).
260. See IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 219, at 75-79 (discussing controversial patent
cases involving traditional knowledge and genetic resources).
261. See supra notes 145-54 for a discussion of the proposal to introduce a disclosure
requirement.
262. See Finger, supra note 138, at 23-24. See generally Gillian N. Rattray, The Enola Bean Patent




States,263 was caused by the issuance of a patent and plant variety protection
certificate to the Enola variety of yellow beans that originated from Mexico. 264
To be certain, it is difficult to distinguish between the patented beans and
the naturally grown variety, and it is also worth pointing out that the patent in
the Enola beans has since been revoked.265 Thus, technically, it is not the
protective regime per se that caused the problem, but rather the failed or
improper implementation of that regime. However, from the standpoint of
traditional communities, this type of situation would not have occurred had
intellectual property rights not been aggressively protected in the first place. To
them, the abuse was an inevitable result of the continuous and ill-advised
expansion and overzealous enforcement of intellectual property rights.
H. Resistance
Commentators have widely documented the growing problems of
biopiracy 266 and the continuous push for stronger intellectual property
protection, which ranges from heightened protection through the TRIPS
Agreement to additional safeguards through the recently established bilateral
and regional agreements. 267 As a result, traditional communities and less-
developed countries are eager to use the protection of intangible cultural
heritage to fight back. As Professor Taubman noted, "in practice, the impulse
towards strengthened protection of TK originates from a sense that IP rights
have been used to misappropriate material that might otherwise have fallen into
the public domain."268
Although traditional communities and less-developed countries understand
the need to reduce biopiracy and the continued pressure to expand intellectual
property rights, some of them may not have any overarching objectives other
than to resist the continuing push for stronger protection by nontraditional
communities and developed countries. As Professor Harding observed, "at least
one individual has expressed a sentiment about repatriation that is likely
263. Rattray, supra note 262.
264. U.S. Patent No. 5,894,079 (filed Nov. 15, 1996).
265. The U.S. Patent & Trademark Office struck down the Enola bean patent on April 29, 2008.
Press Release, ETC Group, Hollow Victory: Enola Bean Patent Smashed at Last (Maybe) (Apr. 29,
2008), available at http://www.etcgroup.org/en/materials/publications.html?pubid=683.
266. For discussions of biopiracy, see generally VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRAcY: THE PLUNDER OF
NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE (1997); IKECHI MGBEOJI, GLOBAL BIOPIRACY: PATENTS, PLANTS AND
INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE (2006); Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and
Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11 (1998); Peter Drahos, Indigenous Knowledge, Intellectual Property
and Biopiracy: Is a Global Bio-Collecting Society the Answer?, 2000 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 245
(2000); Heald, supra note 124; Ikechi Mgbeoji, Patents and Traditional Knowledge of the Uses of
Plants: Is a Communal Patent Regime Part of the Solution to the Scourge of Bio Piracy?, 9 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 163 (2001); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 125.
267. For a discussion of the continuous push for stronger intellectual property protection through
the TRIPS Agreement and TRIPS-plus regional and bilateral trade and investment agreements, see
generally Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827 (2007).
268. Taubman, supra note 170, at 543.
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common among Native Americans: 'Our dream is to pull a U-Haul up and take
back as much as we can."' 2 69 This comment captures very well the fight-back
mentality of many traditional communities and less-developed countries. To
them, the new framework for the protection of intangible cultural heritage is not
just a shield to protect themselves, but also a sword to enable them to recapture
what they have lost under the current unfair system.270
To be certain, the wide use of resistance is likely to stifle international
cooperation and result in greater isolation. However, it is understandable why
these communities want to fight back through resistance-as compared to, say,
cooperation. There has been growing mistrust between developed and less-
developed countries as well as between traditional and nontraditional
communities about the willingness and ability of the current legal regime to
protect intangible cultural heritage. 271
Moreover, the push for stronger protection for intangible cultural heritage
would provide the needed "bargaining chips" to ward off the push by developed
countries for stronger intellectual property protection. As Robert Sherwood
recounted his exchange with a Brazilian diplomat,
I recall the diplomat in Buenos Aires who said in a public forum that
Argentina must withhold the intellectual property chip because
Argentina has few others to play into the international trade
negotiations game. He speaks for many other developing country trade
negotiators. I later suggested to him, privately, that more might be
achieved for the Argentine trade account if robust intellectual property
were installed immediately. The result could well be that more
Argentine producers and farmers would upgrade their products, crops
and animals and become more competitive internationally. Instead, if
they wait for eventual trade negotiation success, they might lower a
European tariff a few notches, if that, but the gain would be narrow
and selective, rather than sweeping across the industrial and
agricultural sectors of the economy. He readily agreed, but insisted
that the chip must be withheld to give his country something with
which to bargain.272
This encounter shows that less-developed countries may not necessarily
want to request protection in those areas, but they choose to do so because they
fear that they would not have any bargaining chips left for future negotiations.
The same can be said of traditional communities. Like many less-developed
countries, these communities remain frustrated by the existing system, and some
of them have become increasingly desperate. As Suzan Harjo, the former head
269. Harding, supra note 184, at 515 (quoting David Whitney, Old Photographs Were Key to
Return, http://www.tlingithaida.org/what'shap/objects.html (July 19, 2000)).
270. See WIPO, IP & TCE, supra note 175, at 13 (discussing "positive and defensive strategies");
Dutfield, supra note 111, at 496 (discussing "positive protection" and "defensive protection" of
traditional knowledge).
271. See generally Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 369
(2006).




of the National Congress of American Indians, put it poignantly, "[t]hey have
stolen our land, water, our dead relatives, the stuff we are buried with, our
culture, even our shoes. There's little left that's tangible. Now they're taking
what's intangible. '" 273
I. Summary
In sum, the stakeholders in the intangible cultural heritage debate want to
achieve many different objectives and have since advanced a rich variety of
proposals. An understanding of these objectives and proposals would certainly
help us better appreciate the stakes involved in the debate. Such an
understanding would provide important clues as to how to design the new
framework to protect the relevant stakeholders. It would also provide more
information about the competing interests within traditional communities and
the potential challenges for achieving international consensus on the protection
of intangible cultural heritage.
Most of the objectives and proposals discussed in this Article are not
mutually exclusive, and advocates of strong protection for intangible cultural
heritage often combine different objectives to craft their proposals. However,
some of these objectives may overlap or conflict with each other, while the
others may affect only a minority of the stakeholders. Understanding these
objectives, therefore, would serve a third purpose: it helps us anticipate the
political dynamics of future negotiations in the area.
In the near future, achieving consensus is likely to remain a challenge. If the
framework is defined too narrowly, focusing exclusively on selected objectives,
the framework is unlikely to have enough buy-in from the stakeholders. This is
not uncommon in conventions that seek to protect cultural heritage: one only has
to consider the membership of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, which is made up
of mostly source nations. 274 However, if the framework is defined broadly to
incorporate all the different objectives, or at least most of them, its vague,
aspirational, and all-encompassing language may ultimately reduce the
framework's effectiveness.275 The limits of the 2005 UNESCO Convention may
provide a good warning signal.
It took more than thirteen years to finalize the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples. Similarly, despite meeting for more than eight years, the
WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore has yet to offer any concrete
treaty proposal or major declaration. 276 It is, therefore, likely to take some time
273. Farley, supra note 122, at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Leslie Sowers,
Going Native/Just a Trend, Heartfelt Seeking-or Cultural Theft?, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 12, 1993, at
1).
274. See Dutra, supra note 98, at 77 (stating few market nations signed 1970 UNESCO
Convention while most source nations became signatories).
275. See Mezey, supra note 9, at 2013 (noting that 2005 UNESCO Convention is more
"aspirational... than obligatory").
276. See Kaitlin Mara, No Agreement for WIPO Committee on Traditional Knowledge and
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before this new framework can offer concrete protection to intangible cultural
heritage. The issues may also become more interesting and complex as new
players emerge and as new issues arise.
III. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES
While traditional communities push for stronger protection of intangible
cultural heritage to achieve different objectives, many challenges remain at the
implementation stage after an international framework has been built. This Part
focuses on four of these challenges: (1) the mode of protection, (2) the power to
define, (3) the means of identification, and (4) the justifiability of international
intervention.
A. Mode of Protection
As Part I has shown, the model for protecting intangible cultural heritage
can be very different depending on whether such protection is analogized to that
of cultural relics or intellectual property. In fact, the definition of intangible
cultural heritage is so broad that many different bodies of law can be applied to
the protection of such heritage. For example, intangible cultural heritage can be
protected through laws developed in the areas of intellectual property, moral
rights, environmental protection, biological diversity, historic preservation, food
production, human rights, international trade, export control, and tourism. They
can also be protected through the use of customary or tribal law. 27 7 In addition,
Folklore, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH, Oct. 18, 2008, available at http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2008/10/18/no-agreement-for-wipo-committee-on-traditional-knowledge-and-
folklore/ (noting the deadlock in WIPO negotiations on international protection of traditional
knowledge and folklore). See generally Arezzo, supra note 27, at 393-98 (discussing developments in
WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore). Nonetheless, the Draft Provisions for the Protection of Traditional Cultural
Expressions/Expressions of Folklore include provisions on objectives, general guiding principles, and
substantive provisions. See generally Excerpts from Documents of the WIPO Intergovernmental
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS, supra note 24, at 303.
277. See, e.g., SHINYA, supra note 130, at 34 (discussing use of customary protocols to protect
traditional cultural expressions); Paul Kuruk, The Role of Customary Law Under Sui Generis
Frameworks of Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional and Indigenous Knowledge, 17 IND. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 67, 80-86 (2007) (discussing effectiveness of customary law as mechanism to protect
traditional and indigenous knowledge); Riley, supra note 113, at 161 (emphasizing importance of
drawing on sui generis tribal law systems in developing protection for cultural resources and
traditional knowledge); Meghana RaoRane, Comment, Aiming Straight: The Use of Indigenous
Customary Law to Protect Traditional Cultural Expressions, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 827 (2006)
(arguing that use of indigenous customary laws of the communities seeking protection would be more
effective in protecting traditional cultural expressions than introduction of intellectual property rights
and sui generis protection). As Professor Riley maintained,
[I]ndigenous groups must organize and to some extent, formalize, tribal laws governing the
protection, maintenance, ownership, control, and alienability of their cultural property.
Tribes themselves must decide whether laws should be written or transmitted orally, whether
they should be fixed and certain, or flexible and accommodating. The codes can and should
be established in accordance with the tribes' traditional and customary law and governing
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such protection can take the form of governance treaties, mutual recognition
agreements, 278 trust funds, 279 levies,280 private contracts (including knowledge
transfer and research collaborative agreements), 281 voluntary guidelines or codes
of conduct,282 and the development of cooperative partnerships 283 and collective
societies. 284
At the international level, the protection becomes even more complicated.
Because of the growing complexity, incoherence, and fragmentation of
international law,285 there may not be a clear-cut determination as to which
principles. For tribes that are firmly rooted in a history of oral tradition, a system of written
laws may seem awkward. Tribes may find, however, that they can extend their legitimacy
through articulation and application of laws that reflect tribal custom, and are recorded for
future use. Regardless whether a particular tribe decides to codify customary law in written
form, simply clarifying and, if necessary, re-establishing customary law will reinforce tribal
practices of maintaining, sharing, and controlling traditional knowledge.
Riley, supra note 113, at 161-62 (footnote omitted).
278. See generally Paul Kuruk, Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur: Mutual Recognition Agreements as
a Policy Response to the Misappropriation of Foreign Traditional Knowledge in the United States, 34
PEPP. L. REV. 629 (2007).
279. See 2005 UNESCO Convention, supra note 3, art. 18(1) (establishing International Fund for
Cultural Diversity); 2003 UNESCO Convention, supra note 1, arts. 25-28 (stipulating provisions for
development of Fund for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage); DARRELL A. POSEY
& GRAHAM DUTFIELD, BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TOWARD TRADITIONAL RESOURCE
RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 137 (1996) (discussing Fund for
Farmers' Rights). As Erin Slattery described,
Japan implemented a program called the Trust Fund for the Preservation and Promotion of
Intangible Cultural Heritage in 1993 to document, study, and preserve intangible cultural
heritage. Thus far, Japan has contributed millions of dollars to [sic] "to preserve and
promote outstanding intangible cultural heritage, such as traditional performing arts like
dances and music, traditional crafts like ceramics, lacquer ware, and dyeing and weaving and
oral heritage, mainly in the Asian region."
Slattery, supra note 67, at 252 (footnote omitted) (quoting Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,
UNESCO Japanese Trust Fund for Preservation and Promotion of Intangible Cultural Heritage,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/heritage/coop/fund-p.html).
280. See PARRY, supra note 33, at 261-62 (advancing proposal for levies on commercial products
that are based on collected natural materials and on users of genetic-sequence databases and
indigenous-knowledge databases).
281. See Gimez, supra note 42, at 82-83 (discussing criteria and terms of research collaborative
agreements used by Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad in Costa Rica).
282. See Dutfield, supra note 111, at 531 (discussing "ethical guidelines or standards, under which
an industry or researcher may be ethically bound to follow or respect the customary laws of the source
community"); Gerstenblith, supra note 102, at 189-92 (discussing "increasing regulation through
voluntary self-regulation").
283. See generally Barbara T. Hoffman, Partnership Paradigms Combining Microbial Discovery
with Preservation of Tropical Biodiversity and Sustainable Development, in ART AND CULTURAL
HERITAGE, supra note 42, at 448 (discussing use of cooperative partnerships).
284. See Drahos, supra note 266 (discussing the development of "global biocollecting society").
285. See CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION:
RESURGENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 66 (2007) (advancing concept of forum
proliferation); Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy
and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 596-600 (2007) (discussing growing
"proliferation of international regulatory institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous
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international regime would provide the primary protection for intangible cultural
heritage. As I wrote in the introduction to a 2002 traditional knowledge
conference, "[g]iven the diverse array of issues involved in the protection of
folklore, traditional knowledge, and indigenous practices, it would be very
unlikely that a single international intergovernmental organization can shape, or
even dominate, the discussions."28 6 The IPR Commission supported this
assertion in its final report:
It is essential that all of the agencies considering the issue work
together to avoid unnecessary duplication and to ensure that the
debate includes as many different views as possible.... We believe...
that no single body is likely to have the capacity, expertise or resources
to handle all aspects of traditional knowledge. Indeed it is our view
that a multiplicity of measures, only some of them IP-related, will be
necessary to protect, preserve and promote traditional knowledge.2 87
Even after a state has decided what type of laws to use to protect intangible
cultural heritage, there remain difficult questions concerning the mode of such
protection. There is a tendency for policymakers to rely on the property model
when new protection is needed. There is real property, personal property,
intellectual property, and, of course, cultural property.288 Given the fact that the
property model has been used as the basis for the protection of both cultural
relics and intellectual property, it would be no surprise if policymakers and
commentators focus on the property aspects of the protection for intangible
cultural heritage. 289
Nevertheless, some other models exist and may better promote the different
objectives in the new framework. Jerome Reichman and Tracy Lewis, for
example, have championed the use of liability rules to provide protection for
traditional knowledge.2 90 One can also explore the use of certification marks and
geographical indications, rewards that are based on stewardship and local
innovation, moral rights-type protection, and open source and collaborative
models.291 In light of the existence of these many possible models, it would be ill
boundaries"); Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property
Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 13-21 (discussing development of "international intellectual
property regime complex"). For a collection of articles discussing the interactions between different
international regimes and the overlapping protection they offer, see generally Symposium, The
International Intellectual Property Regime Complex, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1.
286. Yu, supra note 23, at 242-43.
287. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 219, at 78 (footnote omitted).
288. E.g., Harding, supra note 50, at 303-04; Steven Wilf, What Is Property's Fourth Estate?
Cultural Property and the Fiduciary Ideal, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 177, 177 (2001).
289. Compare Harding, supra note 50, at 303-04 (noting tendency to classify cultural materials as
separate types of property), with Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem,
2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 1-6 (discussing use of intellectual property label and warning against
treating intellectual property as property).
290. Reichman, supra note 158, at 1777; Reichman & Lewis, supra note 162, at 365-66.
291. See Arezzo, supra note 27, at 410-12 (discussing use of open source and collaborative
models in relation to protection of traditional knowledge). As Emanuela Arezzo noted, "[tlhe
[Vol. 81
CULTURAL RELICS
advised to extend the current cultural property or intellectual property model to
intangible cultural heritage without seriously exploring the strength and
weakness of each model and the differences between the protection of cultural
relics and that of intellectual property. 292
Moreover, it is important to remember that the legal approach is not the
only approach that can be used to protect intangible cultural heritage or resolve
disputes in this area. Nonlegal techniques, like negotiation and the use of
technology, sometimes may help. Consider, for example, the filming of the
fictitious Mount Doom in the Lord of the Rings trilogy. The movies were shot in
New Zealand, and Mount Ruapehu on central North Island was selected as the
site for Mount Doom. Unfortunately, as Mark Perry explained,
[T]his particular mountain is one of a range with special significance
for Maori. Now in Tongariro National Park, the central volcanoes were
given to the Crown by Te Heuheu Tukino, Chief of the Ngati
Tuwharetoa, who was concerned that the sacred mountains would fall
into the hands of developers. The image of Ruapehu, particularly the
peak, is treated as tapu, or sacred, by some Maori to this day. The
Maori of the area were uncomfortable with a movie using the image of
the mountain as Mount Doom in the Lord of the Rings.293
Some Maoris even "do not look at its peak and consider drawing or
photographing it offensive." 294
To avoid a potential conflict, director Peter Jackson could have taken the
legal route to resolve the dispute by obtaining permission, which likely would
have been very hard to get considering the volcano's sacredness. He and his
studio could have also prepared for a potential legal battle, which might have
included a decent monetary settlement and protracted negotiations. Jackson
chose neither. Taking into account the Maoris' cultural sensitivities, Jackson
struck an innovative compromise by "agree[ing] to film the mountain from a
nearby ski area and to use digital effects to make it unrecognizable. The resulting
fiery, lava-covered slopes conceal the real appearance of Ruapehu while meeting
the creative needs of the project. '295 Such a technology-oriented approach not
only responded to most of the Maoris' concerns, but also benefited the movie
producers and the theater-going public.
B. Power to Define
Once the framework is built, there are additional considerations about what
type of materials should be covered in the protective regime. Although who
collective and cumulative model of [traditional knowledge] creation resembles,.even more closely, the
viral effect underlying open source software." Id. at 410 (emphasis omitted).
292. See Yu, supra note 267, at 899-900 (noting need to explore whether there is alternative
strategy less restrictive to country's social, economic, cultural, and developmental goals).
293. Mark Perry, Digital Propertization of the New Artifacts: The Application of Technologies for
"Soft" Representations of the Physical and Metaphysical, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 671, 699-
700 (2003) (footnotes omitted).




should have the power to make these decisions was once hotly contested, the
prevailing view is that traditional communities should determine for
themselves. 296 As Professor Riley declared, "[flor a tribe, determining the
destiny of collective property, particularly that which is sacred and intended
solely for use and practice within the collective, is a crucial element of self-
determination. ' '297 Likewise, Professor Daes noted,
Indigenous peoples have always had their own laws and procedures for
protecting their heritage and for determining when and with whom
their heritage can be shared. The rules can be complex and they vary
greatly among different indigenous peoples. To describe these rules
thoroughly would be an almost impossible task; in any case, each
indigenous people must remain free to interpret its own system of laws,
as it understands them.2 98
Because self-determination remains one of the major barriers to the successful
protection of traditional communities, it is fair to say that self-determination by
traditional communities is a prerequisite to the successful implementation of this
new framework.
Unfortunately, respect for self-determination only removes part of the
barrier, though a major one. Even if traditional communities possess the power
to determine for themselves what should be protected and how the materials
should be protected, there remain many difficult situations when more than one
community is involved. For example, who should decide when two communities
have competing claims over the materials? Should one community be allowed to
decide over the other? If so, would the other community be able to claim prior
users' rights? 299
This type of situation is actually not uncommon. There is a tendency to
assume that all traditional communities speak with a singular voice, but this is far
from the truth. As Professor Riley observed,
[A]lthough many indigenous creations follow the pattern of oral, inter-
generational works, this is not the only model. Many tribes may, in
fact, recognize property interests that are considered to be more
reflective of a "Western" view than an "indigenous one." The ways in
which indigenous peoples characterize and define property are as
296. As Sarah Harding declared,
If there is a current winner in this debate, at least in print if not in practice, it appears to
be the nationalists. An increasing number of scholars and official documents, both
international and domestic, take the view that the disposition of cultural heritage should be
determined exclusively by source nations or culturally-affiliated groups. As a consequence,
we increasingly view cultural heritage as an issue of cultural, ethnic, or in some cases
minority rights, and as one of the keys to cultural preservation and self-determination.
Harding, supra note 50, at 301 (footnotes omitted).
297. Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous
Communities, 18 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175,204-05 (2000).
298. Working Group Study, supra note 50, $ 27.
299. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 125, at 957 (suggesting community that "ha[s] long used the
process or product at issue" may be considered recipient for rights); Taubman, supra note 170, at 545
(providing for an exception "for the continuation of bona fide prior use").
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varied as the peoples themselves, and Westerners must resist the urge
to narrow and define the "indigenous perspective. '"300
In fact, "a source community may include dissenting voices, and a grant of legal
protection to those who speak on behalf of the community may silence those
voices-always an issue when rights are vested in a group rather than an
individual. 30 1
Moreover, as far as intangible cultural heritage is concerned, "more than
one community makes similar use of the same resources, sometimes even using
the same processes." 3° 2 There have been disputes among indigenous
communities over lineage and heritage. For example, conflict arose in 1999
"when the National Park Service concluded that Navajos have a legitimate
'cultural affiliation' with the Anasazi culture of Chaco Canyon National
Monument in northwestern New Mexico." 30 3 As Professor Brown explained,
The Anasazi-a name now rejected by Pueblo tribes in favor of
"Ancestral Puebloans"-constructed magnificent cliff dwellings and
multi-storied stone structures that draw thousands of tourists to Chaco
Canyon, Mesa Verde, and other national parks in the Southwest.
Ancestral Puebloans are said to have vanished in the thirteenth
century A.D., but the preponderance of scientific evidence, which in
this case generally agrees with Pueblo oral history, supports the view
that the cliff dwellers scattered throughout the region to found the
communities today identified as Pueblo. Contemporary Pueblo people
react to the assertion that Navajos have a "cultural affiliation" with the
Anasazi about the same way the Irish would respond to an English
claim of affiliation with pre-sixteenth-century cultural remains in
Ireland.304
There have also been disputes over the origin of practices and beliefs as well
as to whom the sacred places belong. The Hopis, for example, have "publicly
complained about non-Hopi (especially Navajo) artists creating what is
otherwise traditionally Hopi art as well as such commercial ventures as a liquor
company decanter in the form of a kachina and a comic book featuring kachina
characters. '" 30 5 As an employee of the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office
complained,
[t]he Navajos are taking Hopi qualities, saying that they came into the
fourth world and that they have four sacred colors for the directions.
But those ideas came from us. Now they are involved in eagle
gathering, which is a Hopi practice. We Hopis don't talk first in public
300. Riley, supra note 113, at 161 (footnote omitted).
301. SCAFIDI, supra note 70, at xii.
302. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 125, at 957.
303. BROWN, supra note 126, at 20.
304. Id.
305. James D. Nason, Native American Intellectual Property Rights: Issues in the Control of
Esoteric Knowledge, in BORROWED POWER: ESSAYS ON CULTURAL APPROPRIATION 237, 248 (Bruce
Ziff & Pratima V. Rao eds., 1997).
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gatherings anymore. Now we're afraid that if we say something, the
Navajos will say that it's theirs too.30 6
Indeed, the rivalries between different traditional and indigenous
communities have at times extended to how traditional objects are to be handled
in museums. As Professor Brown observed, "representatives of some Aboriginal
groups have aimed their most vigorous complaints at museums that allow ritual
objects to be seen by Aboriginal people belonging to different societies or clans.
In these cases, they prefer that the materials be handled by non-Aboriginal
staff."307
To complicate things, the two communities in this rather simple
hypothetical may be making competing claims over something that was created
by or derived from a third community, which has yet to be identified, no longer
exists, or chooses to stay neutral. 30 8 To take one recent example, regarding
ownership of a sacred bundle held by the American Museum of Natural History,
"Montana, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba Crees are all independently claiming
ownership as is the adopted great-great-grandson of Plains Cree Chief Big Bear.
Determining who owned the bundle after Big Bear's death, and thus whether the
transfer was legitimate, will not be an easy task."30 9 In those cases, our
understanding of concurrent ownership, joint authorship, and derivative works
may shed some light on how to resolve the dispute. 310 However, problems
remain if the original community has yet to be identified, no longer exists, or
chooses to stay out of the dispute, for whatever reasons. To some extent, these
problems are similar to those confronting Peru in Peru v. Johnson.311 In that
case, the court rejected Peru's claims based on the fact that the contested
artifacts could also be identified with those found in Bolivia or Ecuador. 312 To
remedy these problems, commentators have advocated the establishment of
"international cultural property trusts" to enable countries to share
responsibility for and benefits of their shared cultural heritage. 313
If the hypothetical is not challenging enough, there might also be "family
feuds" within the community-for example, when the youngsters disagreed with
their elders.314 (The reverse situation-where the elders disagreed with the
306. BROWN, supra note 126, at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
307. Id. at 32.
308. See Marion P. Forsyth, International Cultural Property Trusts: One Response to Burden of
Proof Challenges in Stolen Antiquities Litigation, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 197, 198 (2007) (noting "the need
for a unified claim in American courts by modern states that share ancient cultural boundaries").
309. Harding, supra note 218, at 724 (footnote omitted).
310. See SCAFIDI, supra note 70, at 161-62 (discussing concurrent ownership of property). The
concept of joint authorship, nevertheless, presents some problems. As Silke von Lewinski stated,
"[blecause of the lack of individual authorship in expressions of folklore, applying the concept of co-
authorship does not remedy the situation, because co-authors are still individual authors who have
decided to create a work together and according to a common plan." Silke von Lewinski, The
Protection of Folklore, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 747, 758 (2003).
311. 720 F. Supp. 810 (C.D. Cal. 1989), afftd, 933 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1991).
312. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. at 812.
313. Forsyth, supra note 308, at 202.
314. See Ronald Sackville, Legal Protection of Indigenous Culture in Australia, 11 CARDOZO J.
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youngsters-happens often and is generally not as important, because tribal law
tends to grant decision-making power to the elders). 315 There could also be
internal disagreement within a community, in which the majority prevails over
the minority. While it is important to let the community decide for themselves,
the decisions they make-such as the controversial decision by the Cherokee
Nation of Oklahoma to strip the Freedmen of tribal membership 316 or a
seemingly backward cultural choice of banning the written word3 t7-may not
always be satisfactory or popular. Nevertheless, as many in those communities
would argue, regardless of how unsatisfactory the decisions may be, they would
still be better than abrogation of their sovereignty.
Notwithstanding the importance of self-determination in this situation, it is
hard to ignore the important countervailing interests of the departing group-
either because they do not have the numbers to prevail in a majority contest or
because they have chosen to leave. To some extent, this minority group--either
as prior users or continuing innovators-deserves some form of protection.
318 If
they continue to maintain a traditional lifestyle, the use of traditional materials is
likely to remain important to them. Moreover, the heritage of the original group
will always remain part of their cultural heritage. Just because they are no longer
in the group does not mean that they should also give up their heritage.
Most bizarre of all, there may be questions about whether protection should
be given to a community that no longer creates or manufactures the traditional
products they are now selling. When Professor Farley wrote her pioneering
article on the protection of folklore of indigenous peoples more than a decade
ago, she asked, "What can the Navajos do to prevent non-Navajos from using
Navajo rug patterns to produce rugs overseas using cheap materials and labor,
thereby undercutting the Navajos themselves in a market for their famous
rugs?" 319 While this question remains important, things have changed somewhat
as a result of rapid globalization.
Today, the manufacture of some traditional products has been outsourced
abroad-to countries like China, India, Vietnam, and other parts of Southeast
Asia, where the production costs are low and the weaving skills are high. People
both within and outside the traditional communities sometimes jointly
manufacture some of these products. In those situations, one has to wonder
whether and how much protection should still be extended to the community. As
INT'L & COMP. L. 711, 739-40 (2003) (explaining, in case of Australian $10 bank note that reproduced
Aboriginal artist's design, that some decisions can only be made by the elders).
315. As Chidi Oguamanam noted, "[iln most of Africa, [for example] old age is a synonym for
wisdom, an indication of deep spirituality and closeness to the ancestors." OGUAMANAM, supra note
37, at 128.
316. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, On Black Freedmen (MSU Legal Stud. Working Paper Group,
Paper No. 05-08, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015282.
317. Cf. SCAFIDI, supra note 70, at 32 (emphasizing European choice for written word as
"cultural choice").
318. See Taubman, supra note 170, at 545 (providing for an exception "for the continuation of
bona fide prior use").
319. Farley, supra note 122, at 1.
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the author of a Department of Canadian Heritage study asked, "If the creation
of the sculpture also involved artisans from outside the community, would the
use of these artisans invalidate the sculpture as a legitimate work originating
from a particular individual, family, clan, association or community?" 320
A work-based protective model seems to suggest that the community
should continue to obtain protection in both situations. However, a location-
based model, such as geographical indications or appellations of origin, seems to
suggest otherwise. Ultimately, the answer to this question depends on whether
the system seeks to protect the community or the traditional craft. If the former,
it is important to enable the community to make the products however they want
and as efficiently as they can, not to mention the importance of tribal sovereignty
and the community's right to self-determination. If the latter, however, the
decision to outsource the manufacturing process may invalidate their products
for tradition-based protection.
In a recent work, Professor Sunder asked a similar question with respect to
the protection traditional weavers from Mysore receive through geographical
indications. As she observed, "Mysore silk sarees .... ha[ve] had a makeover
since obtaining a geographical indication, updating [their] look with trendy new
(but interestingly, natural) colors . . . and 'contemporary' designs inspired by
temple architecture and tribal jewelry." 321 One question remains, however:
"What rights do traditional weavers from Mysore have if they move to North
India-or the U.K.? ' 322 According to Professor Sunder,
[T]here are good reasons to prevent the alienation of the GI
[geographical indication] from the particular geographical community.
It prevents the scenario in which a large foreign corporation hires a
member of that community away and then begins to produce
"authentic" work elsewhere, using that GI-and decimating the
livelihoods of the traditional community left behind. At the same time,
such a restriction could stifle opportunities for some individuals, as
they remain within a traditional community by economic necessity, not
choice. People move, intermarry, and change jobs. Culture flows with
them.323
C. Means of Identification
Once the first two sets of questions are settled, the implementing laws have
to tackle the challenge of determining the means to identify the protected
cultural materials-for the rights holders, users, and administrators involved in
the protected system and the larger international network. As the IPR
Commission pointed out, "[i]n the absence of any accessible written record, a
patent examiner in another country is unable to access documentation that
320. SHINYA, supra note 130, at 31.
321. Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 2007, at 97, 110.




would challenge the novelty or inventiveness of an application based on
traditional knowledge." 324 The lack of such a record indeed provides a strong
reason to grant patents to preexisting traditional knowledge and genetic
resources.
Unfortunately, because of the intangible nature of the materials-and, in
some cases, the lack of written records-identifying the protectable subject
matter has not been easy. Thus far, "China offers a Traditional Chinese
Medicine Patents Database, recording traditional acupuncture, herbal medicine,
animal-derived drugs, and mineral drugs in a format searchable by patent
examiners." 325 India has created a Traditional Knowledge Digital Library to
convert traditional knowledge into fixed form. 326 This database allows users and
administrators to determine what the existing regime covers. Such databases, or
similar inventory systems, also help "document and preserve [the materials], thus
protecting [them] from complete loss."327 Legislators in other countries, most
recently South Africa, have proposed similar laws.328 The inventory approach is
also enshrined in the 2003 UNESCO Convention. 329
Unfortunately, three problems remain. First, culture is dynamic, fluid, and
constantly evolving. 330 The creation of intangible cultural heritage is more a
process than the product of that process.331 As Professor Sunder explained,
324. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 219, at 81; accord TRIPS Council, Elements of the
Obligation to Disclose, supra note 28, 3 (presenting argument that patent examiners cannot evaluate
patentability of claimed invention without access to relevant prior art).
325. Chander & Sunder, supra note 127, at 1357.
326. Dutfield, supra note 111, at 509. For discussions of traditional knowledge databases and
related inventory systems, see generally id. at 509-11; de Carvalho, supra note 145, at 258-61.
327. de Carvalho, supra note 145, at 245.
328. As Chidi Oguamanan pointed out,
At present, India is providing support for the creation of TKDL for the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation . . . comprising Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The Cameroon-based African Regional
Industrial Property Organization ... has also expressed interest in an African regional
TKDL. Several individual countries, including South Africa, Mongolia, and Thailand have
expressed the interest to engage in similar national initiatives.
Chidi Oguamanam, Patents and Traditional Medicine: Digital Capture, Creative Legal Interventions,
and the Dialectics of Knowledge Transformation, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 489, 504 (2008)
(footnotes omitted); see also Ramesh Menon, Traditional Knowledge Receives a Boost, INDIA
TOGETHER, Jan. 13, 2007, http://www.indiatogether.org/2007/jan/eco-tkdl.htm (reporting interest in
creating traditional knowledge databases or libraries in Iran, South Korea, Thailand, Cambodia, South
Africa, Nigeria, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh).
329. See 2003 UNESCO Convention, supra note 1, art. 12(1) (requiring state parties to draw up
and update inventories of intangible cultural heritage present in their territories).
330. SCAFIDI, supra note 70, at xii; Michael J. Balick, Traditional Knowledge: Lessons from the
Past, Lessons for the Future, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW, supra note 42, at 280, 280 (noting that
"body of traditional knowledge is never static but rather dynamic in its shape and substance");
Harding, supra note 50, at 334 (noting "fluid and inventive qualities" of culture and describing it as "a
form of 'collective intentionality"' and "a forward-looking, non-static phenomenon," as compared to
"backward-looking 'traditionalism"' (quoting GERALD M. SIDER, CULTURE AND CLASS IN
ANTHROPOLOGY AND HISTORY 94 (1986))).
331. See WIPO, IP & TCE, supra note 175, at 5 (noting that traditional cultural expressions are
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Traditional people move, intermarry, share ideas, and modify their
skills and products to the shifting demands of the market and their
culture. These activities are not merely strategic and pragmatic, but are
evidence of a healthy and dynamic culture. In short, traditional
knowledge is more vibrant and innovative than the
"environmentalism" metaphor, with its emphasis on conservation of
nature's raw materials, acknowledges. 332
As the example of the Igbo people in Nigeria has shown above, many traditional
communities value the process more than they value the products. 333 As a result,
upon completion of their mbaris, they are willing to leave them in utter neglect,
despite the fact that they have spent a lot of time, effort, and resources in
creating these artful objects in the first place.
Most recently, WIPO highlighted the "contemporary aspect" of the
protection of traditional knowledge, which it argued provides "further
justification for legal protection. '" 334 As the organization stated in its promotional
booklet on the protection of traditional knowledge,
What makes knowledge "traditional" is not its antiquity: much TK is
not ancient or inert, but is a vital, dynamic part of the contemporary
lives of many communities today .... TK is being created every day,
and evolves as individuals and communities respond to the challenges
posed by their social environment.335
Professor Sunder also highlighted the "inventiveness" of traditional
knowledge.3 36 As she concurred, "Many of the most ancient monuments survived
because they remained in use. Traditional knowledge techniques survive in this
way, as well, not as static but as continuously evolving as humans innovate
around them to meet current needs and solve contemporary problems."
337
Similar sentiments have been expressed elsewhere. As Doris Long noted,
"[t]raditional knowledge ... changes in response to culture, environment, and
the passage of time. It is a living active concept, and not just the snapshot of what
used to be done back in the good old days." 338 Likewise, the IPR Commission
noted, "Whilst the vast majority of the knowledge is old in the sense that it has
been handed down through the generations, it is continually refined and new
"often the product of inter-generational and fluid social and communal creative processes"); Arezzo,
supra note 27, at 371 (stating that traditional knowledge "is the fruit of an intergenerational process,
whereby generations pass on their cultural heritage which, as time passes, continuously grows");
Harding, supra note 50, at 309 (noting that traditional communities "tend to place greater emphasis on
intangibles and process").
332. Sunder, supra note 321, at 109.
333. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the Igbo
practice of leaving mbaris in utter neglect after their completion.
334. WIPO, IP & TK, supra note 117, at 6.
335. Id.
336. Sunder, supra note 321, at 103 (emphasis omitted).
337. Id. at 110.
338. Doris Estelle Long, Traditional Knowledge and the Fight for the Public Domain, 5 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PRop. L. 617,621 (2006).
[Vol. 81
CULTURAL RELICS
knowledge developed, rather as the modern scientific process proceeds by
continual incremental improvement rather than by major leaps forward. ' 339
As far as cultural materials are concerned, there is always a tendency to
develop "a museum-like vision of unchanging, ahistorical 'noble savages.' ' 34°
However, this vision is outdated and culturally insensitive. As Professor Scafidi
noted with respect to the 2003 UNESCO Convention and traditional knowledge
databases, "mechanisms such as national inventories speak to the warehousing
rather than the evolution of living culture. '341
Moreover, as Michael Finger pointed out, "no one's life is entirely
traditional, and no one's life is entirely modern. Traditional versus modern is
better thought of as opposite ends of a scale rather than as a clean sorting. '342
Thus, the evolving nature of intangible cultural heritage and the potential for
mixing both traditional and nontraditional materials have made the inventory
and identification process somewhat difficult. If the system is not constantly
updated to reflect the changing culture, it may not fully capture the essence of
the intangible heritage of the relevant communities. However, if it is constantly
updated, guidelines need to be developed to determine how the protection
should be extended to new forms of cultural materials. Otherwise, the protective
regime would lose its consistency, coherence, and effectiveness.
The second problem concerns the difficulty in developing an inventory of
intangible cultural heritage. Article 12 of the 2003 UNESCO Convention states:
"To ensure identification with a view to safeguarding, each State Party shall
draw up, in a manner geared to its own situation, one or more inventories of the
intangible cultural heritage present in its territory. These inventories shall be
regularly updated. '343 Unfortunately, "living cultures cannot be reduced to
diagrams on a printed page or data on a CD,"'344 and "not all traditional
knowledge can be expressed in a fixed form. ' 345 Moreover, many countries
would not have the needed resources to develop a reliable inventory system,
even if such a system could be developed. As Richard Kurin noted, "[m]ost
nations have developed some form of archives documenting intangible cultural
heritage, but they generally lack the resources adequate to keep up with
cataloguing and preservation functions. '346
The third problem concerns the fact that not all works should be identified;
works that are sacred or intended to be kept secret are usually off limits. Even
within a community, there are restrictions on who can handle or disseminate
339. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 219, at 75.
340. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 125, at 957.
341. SCAFIDI, supra note 70, at x.
342. Finger, supra note 138, at 31.
343. 2003 UNESCO Convention, supra note 1, art. 12(1).
344. Michael F. Brown, Safeguarding the Intangible, CULTURAL COMMONS, Nov. 2003,
http://www.culturalcommons.org/comment-print.cfm?ID= 12.
345. OGUAMANAM, supra note 37, at 151.
346. Kurin, supra note 55, at 73; see also OGUAMANAM, supra note 37, at 151 (noting that "the
operational modality of the digitalization process raises issues of funding").
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certain forms of knowledge. 347 The identification and inventory mechanisms and
the documentation requirement therefore create a dilemma for those in the
community who have to decide between obtaining protection and breaking their
secrecy vows.
348
The documentation requirement may also undermine the "unique spiritual
and cultural character" of the concerned knowledge and expressions. 349 By
ignoring cultural respect and privacy, the requirement may even endanger the
survival of a community. As Professor Riley noted, "The idea of disclosing
traditional knowledge within a public forum-even one with controlled access-
represents a risk of exploitation and destruction that is, for many, far too
great. '350 Indeed, many indigenous rights advocates "believe that databases will
only make it easier for those who wish to exploit cultural heritage and steal
secret and sacred traditions .... [They consider] the proposal 'entirely wrong-
headed." 351
Some even have compared the release of culturally sensitive information to
indigenous communities digging a grave for themselves. If the community
discloses which artifact is the most important to them, that object is likely to be
stolen very quickly. It is small wonder that "the Hopi Tribe . . . request
repatriation of all Hopi artifacts on the grounds that anything made by Hopis is
sacred by definition." 352 As an employee of the Hopi Cultural Preservation
Office justified, "[e]ven something like a digging stick could have a ritual use, but
we're not about to say what it is."
353
D. Justifiability of International Intervention
Finally, there may be questions about whether countries should be able to
intervene in the conservation of other countries' intangible cultural heritage
when the target countries have no interest in protecting the materials or do not
have the means or capacity to do so. In the cultural relics area, commentators
have underscored the need for international intervention to prevent the
destruction of such important monuments as the Buddhas of Bamiyan by the
Taliban regime of Afghanistan 354 or churches and mosques in Bosnia-
347. See, e.g., Working Group Study, supra note 50, 1 83 (stating that "[almong Salish people in
the Pacific Northwest region of North America, songs belong to lineages, but in each generation a
song may be sung only by a single individual who has been given this right" (citation omitted)).
348. See BROWN, supra note 126, at 20 (noting that indigenous peoples are "put in the unhappy
position of violating their tribe's canons of secrecy in order to substantiate claims that particular
objects are sacred").
349. OGUAMANAM, supra note 37, at 151.
350. Riley, supra note 113, at 160.
351. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Daes, supra note 120, at 145).
352. BROWN, supra note 126, at 20.
353. Id. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
354. See generally Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The Destruction of the Buddhas of
Bamiyan and International Law, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 619 (2003) (arguing for international sanctions and
criminal charges against governments that intentionally destroy important cultural artifacts).
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Herzegovina. 355 Their destruction not only affects the Afghans or Bosnians, but
all humanity.
Taking the cultural internationalist perspective, as articulated by Professor
Merryman,356 one would argue that there should be some form of international
intervention to protect these works-perhaps through the creation of obligations
erga omnes partes (obligations that a state owes to all parties to an international
agreement). 357 After all, there are already treaties concerning how cultural relics
should be protected in wartime-notable examples being the 1907 Hague
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 358 and the 1954
Hague Convention.359 As Janet Blake noted, the latter convention
was developed in great part in response to the destruction and looting
of monuments and works of art during the Second World War. It grew
out of a feeling that action to prevent their deterioration or destruction
was one responsibility of the emerging international world order and
an element in reconciliation and the prevention of future conflicts. 360
Likewise, countries have enacted laws to protect the public interest in art. The
California Civil Code, for example, emphasizes the "public interest in preserving
the integrity of cultural and artistic creations." 361 The code states that "[a]n
organization acting in the public interest may commence an action for injunctive
355. See generally Gregory M. Mose, The Destruction of Churches and Mosques in Bosnia-
Herzegovina: Seeking a Rights-Based Approach to the Protection of Religious Cultural Property, 3
BUFF. J. INT'L L. 180 (1996) (arguing that, in aftermath of Yugoslavian conflict and related destruction
of culturally significant churches and mosques, internationally recognized right to practice religion
should be used to protect religious cultural property).
356. As Professor Merryman noted,
One way of thinking about cultural property-i.e., objects of artistic, archaeological,
ethnological or historical interest-is as components of a common human culture, whatever
their places of origin or present location, independent of property rights or national
jurisdiction. That is the attitude embodied in the Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of May 14, 1954 . . . , which culminates a
development in the international law of war that began in the mid-19th century.
Merryman, supra note 74, at 831-32 (footnotes omitted); accord Harding, supra note 50, at 301 (noting
that "the internationalists maintain that cultural heritage is the property of all humanity, its
educational, scientific and aesthetic qualities are its most valuable assets, and its proper place is in
Western museums where it can be viewed by a wider audience and its preservation is guaranteed").
357. See Roger O'Keefe, World Cultural Heritage: Obligations to the International Community as
a Whole?, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 189, 190 (2004) (discussing obligation of State Parties to World
Heritage Convention to enforce protection of cultural heritage due to Convention's express references
to universal interest in such protection).
358. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277,
205 Consol. T.S. 277.
359. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 47.
360. Blake, supra note 45, at 61. For excellent discussions of the destruction and looting of art
during the Second World War, see generally LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE
OF EUROPE'S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1994); SPOILS OF
WAR, supra note 50.
361. CAL. CIV. CODE § 989(a) (Deering 2008).
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relief to preserve or restore the integrity of a work of fine art. '362 Massachusetts
and New York have similar art preservation laws.3 63
The need for self-help measures is, indeed, one of the justifications
advanced to provide support for the British Museum to retain the Parthenon
Marbles. For example, those who preferred the Marbles to stay in Britain have
argued that Greece would not be able to preserve their condition as well as the
British Museum. 364 Most recently, Eric Posner even suggested, somewhat
disturbingly, that a "free market in cultural property" would enable "much
cultural property [to] leave poor, insecure states that suffer from war, corruption,
and inefficient law enforcement, and be stored in wealthy, secure states."365 As
he continued,
In their self-interest, commercial firms would remove cultural property
from war zones and potential war zones, and of course eventually most
cultural property would be sold to museums and private collections
located in secure, first-world countries. If the contents of the Baghdad
Museum had been owned and held by museums located in New York,
Tokyo, London, or Chicago, they would never have been stolen or
destroyed during the second Gulf War.3 66
Likewise, Alexander Bauer, editor of the International Journal of Cultural
Property, pointed out that "a licit trade might lead to the restructuring of the
economics of the antiquities trade, such as deflating prices (that had been
inflated because of the risk involved in an illicit trade), which, combined with
increasing enforcement, could undercut the benefits for looters, smugglers, and
unscrupulous dealers." 367
While the use of international intervention to protect cultural relics remains
controversial, the use of such intervention to protect intangible cultural heritage
has been highly problematic. To begin with, such intervention violates tribal
sovereignty and the right to self-determination. As the late Darrell Posey wrote,
the self-determination principle developed by the International Society of
Ethnobiology
recognizes that indigenous peoples have a right to self-determination
(or local determination for traditional and local communities) and that
researchers shall as appropriate acknowledge and respect such rights.
362. Id. § 989(c).
363. See Merryman, supra note 60, at 344 (discussing art preservation laws in Massachusetts and
New York).
364. See CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, THE ELGIN MARBLES: SHOULD THEY BE RETURNED TO
GREECE? 79-83 (1987) (discussing argument that Parthenon Marbles are safer in London than they
would be in Athens); Magnus Magnusson, Introduction to JEANETTE GREENFIELD, THE RETURN OF
CULTURAL TREASURES 1, 8 (2d ed. 1996) (considering "the capacity of the home country to house,
protect, study and display any material that is returned" important factor regarding any decision to
return cultural treasure); John Henry Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1881, 1917 (1985) (noting that "[i]f one had to make a decision based solely on concern for the physical
preservation of the Marbles, it would be difficult to justify moving them to Athens").
365. Posner, supra note 105, at 230.
366. Id.
367. Bauer, supra note 203, at 714.
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Culture and language are intrinsically connected to land and territory,
and cultural and linguistic diversity are inextricably linked to biological
diversity; therefore, the principle of self-determination includes: (1) the
right to control land and territory; (2) the right to sacred places; (3) the
right to own, to determine the use of, and to accreditation, protection,
and compensation for knowledge; (4) the right of access to traditional
resources; (5) the right to preserve and protect local languages,
symbols, and modes of expression; and (6) the right to self-
definition. 368
Moreover, if the use of international intervention to protect tangible
cultural heritage remains debatable, it will be very hard to provide a strong
justification for the protection of intangible cultural heritage. After all, the
intangible nature of the materials strongly suggests the reproducibility of the
materials. As a result, the danger of destruction is great, and such destruction is
not even close to the type of "cultural cleansing" commentators have asserted
with regard to the destruction of cultural relics. 369 Indeed, with the technological
advances brought about by the digital and biotechnology revolutions, verbatim
copies may even be made and protected ex situ.
370
In sum, there are still many challenges concerning how to develop
legislation to implement the new international framework for the protection of
intangible cultural heritage. Nevertheless, these challenges should not deter
policymakers from further developing this framework. Rather, policymakers
should take account of the varying needs and interests involved in protection
offered by the framework. The challenges also suggest the need for a deeper
exploration and careful assessment of the various alternative models and
proposals that may be used to achieve the framework's underlying objectives.
IV. ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES
Part I explored the similarities between the protection of cultural relics and
that of intellectual property. This Part revisits two of these similarities: (1) both
forms of protection concern the same type of enforcement issues and challenges,
and (2) cultural relics and intellectual property in both developed and less-
developed countries suffer from a lack of, or inadequate, protection. In
highlighting these similarities, this Part focuses on countries that have problems
in both areas. It argues that these countries present unique cases for enhancing
368. Posey, supra note 117, at 214.
369. See Mose, supra note 355, at 196 (discussing "cultural cleansing" in the cultural property
context).
370. Nevertheless, there remain challenges to the digitization of cultural materials. As an
indigenous librarian pointed out,
When digitizing cultural materials, the important questions are: How do we send a message
that strengthens the holistic context of each cultural item and collection? How do we ensure
that both indigenous and nonindigenous peoples receive the message? How do we digitize
material taking into account its metaphysical as well as its digital life?
Robert Sullivan, Indigenous Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights: A Digital Library Context, in
ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE, supra note 42, at 416,416.
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our understanding of the protection of intangible cultural heritage. Although this
Part focuses on China, whose problems I am more familiar with, the discussion
can be easily extended to other countries that have similar problems. All of these
countries are likely to provide rich and fertile grounds for further research.
In the near future, China is likely to play very important roles in both the
protection of cultural relics and intellectual property. Its problems in the
intellectual property area have been widely documented. 371 Every year, the
United States entertainment industry claims that it has lost billions of dollars in
China,372 and the United States has repeatedly taken action to induce China to
offer stronger intellectual property protection. 373 For instance, the United States
recently used-with only limited success 374-the WTO dispute settlement
process to resolve its dispute with China over inadequate enforcement of
intellectual property rights. 375
China is also very important in the cultural relics area. As Professor
Merryman noted, "China, with its many centuries of high civilization and its vast
area and large population, may be the richest source of cultural property of
all. ' 376 One would, in fact, expect no less from a country that has close to 5,000
years of history. With greater liberalization of the Chinese economy since the
reopening of the country for trade with the West three decades ago, "China's
antiquities have become increasingly popular with foreign collectors, particularly
with overseas collectors in diverse places as Canada, Singapore, Malaysia, and
the United States." 377
Indeed, just as this Article was being finalized for publication, the Chinese
government had vigorously protested the auction by Christie's of two bronze
fountainheads that were looted from the Old Summer Palace in China during the
371. For some of my earlier discussions about piracy and counterfeiting problems in China, see
generally Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the
Twenty-first Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode
II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006) [hereinafter Yu,
From Pirates to Partners II]; Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China
Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLus ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007) [hereinafter Yu,
China Puzzle]; Yu, supra note 107.
372. See, e.g., Int'l Intellectual Prop. Alliance, USTR 2008 "Special 301" Decisions (June 17,
2008), http://www.iipa.comlpdf/2008USTRdecisionsSpecial3OlAsiaFinal2007LossLevelO61708.pdf
(estimating $3.5 billion in trade losses to United States due to copyright piracy in China in 2007).
373. See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 371, at 185--8.
374. See Kaitlin Mara, Parties Accept WTO Dispute Settlement Report on China IP Protection,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH, Mar. 24, 2009, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/
03124/parties-accept-wto-dispute-settlement-report-on-china-ip-protection (discussing reactions to the
case).
375. See Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26,2009) [hereinafter WTO Panel Report].
376. John Henry Merryman, Foreword to MURPHY, supra note 106, at xiii, xiii; accord Dutra,
supra note 98, at 71 (stating that "[blecause of China's rich history, the landscape is littered with tombs
from various eras-dating from 500 B.C. and earlier, up to the Qing dynasty").
377. Dutra, supra note 98, at 68; see also id. at 72 (discussing how China's recent economic
reforms have "rekindled interest in antiquarianism and collecting relics").
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Second Opium War in 1860.378 These bronze pieces were part of a collection of
artworks and antiques being put up for sale in Paris by the estate of Yves Saint
Laurent, the late famous fashion designer, and his former companion and
longtime business partner.379 Although a group of Chinese lawyers sought to
block the auction in French court, they failed. Ultimately, a Chinese collector
reportedly had sabotaged the auction by submitting two winning bids.380
In addition, scholars have found China "among the limited number of the
world's civilizations to embrace early on the cultural activity of 'collecting.' ' 381
As David Murphy explained, such early collecting history "may well have had a
bearing both on the quantity of relics that have survived, and on their quality,
due to care and preservation. '382 As a result, many cultural artifacts in China
have been carefully preserved, notwithstanding the looting and tragic losses
resulting from foreign attacks in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
the Second World War, and the Cultural Revolution. 383
While the developments in China will provide important insights into issues
explored in this Article, the problems confronting the protection of both cultural
relics and intellectual property will enhance our understanding in one area that
has yet to be addressed: enforcement. When the two areas are considered
together, China has been faulted for its lack of protection regardless of whether
it serves as a source nation or a market nation. In the cultural relics area, it has
been faulted for its lack of protection because it is a source nation. In the
intellectual property area, it has been equally faulted for its lack of protection
because it serves as a market nation.
378. David Barboza, China Seeks to Stop Paris Sale of Bronzes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb, 17, 2009, at C1.
As a journalist described,
The two Qing dynasty bronze animal heads, one depicting a rabbit and the other a rat, are
believed to have been part of a set comprising 12 animals from the Chinese zodiac that were
created for the imperial gardens during the reign of Emperor Qianlong in the 18th century..
. The relics were displayed as fountainheads at the Old Summer Palace, known in Chinese
as Yuanmingyuan, until it was destroyed and sacked by British and French forces in 1860.
Id.
379. Id.
380. Steven Erlanger, China Fails to Halt the Sale of Looted Relics at a Paris Auction, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009, at A9; Mark McDonald & Carol Vogel, Twist in Sale of Relics Has China
Winking, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,2009, at A5.
381. MURPHY, supra note 106, at 28. As Joseph Alsop observed,
Antiques in astonishing variety were pursued as prizes by Chinese collectors during many
centuries before Mao Zedong's revolution. Ancient bronzes had been taken from earliest
times by tomb robbers for the value of their metal; but they began to be sought in another
way-in fact, by antique collectors-in the Song Dynasty.... The Song Dynasty further
produced a substantial body of antiquarian writing on the subject of ancient bronzes.
Dutra, supra note 98, at 69 (quoting JOSEPH ALSOP, THE RARE ART TRADITIONS 249 (1982)); see also
id. at 68-69 (noting that "the tradition of antiquarianism dates back hundreds of years in China,
reflecting the Confucian veneration of and respect for the past").
382. MURPHY, supra note 106, at 28.
383. See, e.g., id. at 48-50 (discussing loss of cultural relics during Cultural Revolution); Dutra,
supra note 98, at 71 (noting that "many priceless relics were lost during the Cultural Revolution").
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Such an outcome is somewhat ironic-and certainly frustrating for the
Chinese. Had the source of protection remained the same in both areas, China
would have been able to avoid criticism in one of the two areas. In fact, if market
nations were considered to be at fault, the blame for problems in the cultural
relics area is likely to shift from China to the United States, "which is generally
regarded as the single largest market for antiquities in the world.''384 This shift
makes great sense in light of the growing illicit trade in cultural relics. As
Professor Bauer recently pointed out, although collectors and supporters of the
antiquities trade have argued that "looting is driven by poverty and a problem of
poor local law enforcement and corruption,... the assertion that demand for
antiquities has no effect on looting is ludicrous and patently false. ' '385
Nevertheless, enforcement remains an area that deserves significant
attention from policymakers. In fact, as Part I has shown, the issues are quite
similar and do not depend on whether the discussion focuses on the protection of
cultural relics or that of intellectual property. If China is able to provide better
enforcement in one area, it is likely to be able to learn from its success and use
similar approaches to enhance protection in other areas. A better understanding
of enforcement in the cultural relics area, therefore, not only will improve the
understanding of enforcement in the intellectual property area, but also that of
enforcement in the intangible cultural heritage area.
The converse, unfortunately, is also true. If China is unable to provide
effective enforcement in one area, it is unlikely to do so in other areas. In fact,
the lack of enforcement in the protection of cultural relics provides a reality
check on the enforcement challenges confronting the Chinese authorities in the
intellectual property area. Such a lack shows how entrenched the enforcement
problems are in not only the intellectual property area, but also other areas of
law enforcement.
Commentators have widely criticized the lack of criminal enforcement of
intellectual property rights in China. Such a lack is, indeed, one of the three main
items targeted for dispute settlement in the recent WTO dispute between China
and the United States over the inadequate enforcement of intellectual property
rights. 386 However, criminal enforcement does not seem to be any more
successful in the cultural relics area. Despite its significant problems with tomb
robbing and thefts of cultural relics from museums and other protected sites,
"China handled [only] forty criminal cases involving 222 artifacts stolen from the
country's protected sites and museums of cultural heritage [in 2004].'387
384. Gerstenblith, supra note 102, at 174.
385. Bauer, supra note 203, at 698.
386. See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, China-Measures
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362i7 (Aug. 21, 2007)
(focusing on high thresholds for criminal procedures and penalties in intellectual property area that
make enforcement of intellectual property rights ineffective); WTO Panel Report, supra note 375, 9
7.396-7.682 (discussing these thresholds).
387. Inbal Baum, Note, The Great Mall of China: Should the United States Restrict Importation of
Chinese Cultural Property?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 919, 920 (2006) (emphasis omitted).
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While commentators have often criticized China for its lack of political will
to enforce intellectual property rights, partly because of its lack of self-
interest,388 one could hardly make the same argument as far as the protection of
cultural relics is concerned. The Chinese authorities have strong political will in
protecting cultural relics. The strong nationalist sentiments also support such
protection. In addition, the high number of tourists that can be attracted to
China by these relics provide both self-interest and economic incentives.
Interestingly, and disappointingly, the benefits, interests, and incentives alone
are not sufficient to result in stronger enforcement. The outcomes for the
protection in both areas are disturbingly the same-ineffective and inadequate.
The limited protection of cultural relics also reflects the tension between the
central and local governments. As I have noted, the heavy and continuous
decentralization of the Chinese government has made it difficult for the country
to respond effectively to the problem of intellectual property enforcement. 389
Similar tension exists in the cultural property context. As Stefan Gruber
observed,
Local governments do not necessarily welcome the discovery of new
cultural heritage sites within the boundaries of their municipality,
particularly where the site is not likely to attract streams of tourists.
Local governments are obliged by law to allocate resources for the
protection of designated heritage sites and take protective measures.
Often newly discovered sites stand in the way of planned building or
other development projects. In the worst case this may lead to the
destruction of the heritage site by the property developer, the workers
who fear for their jobs, or even the authorities who want to push
development in their municipalities. Two recent cases show the
seriousness of such problems in China.
At the end of 2004, in Shanxi Province, bulldozers destroyed a Ming
Dynasty (1368-1644) beacon tower and dozens of tombs that are
believed to be from the Han Dynasty (206 BC-220 AD). The
construction company acted without approval from the local heritage
protection authorities. The required archaeological survey was
considered to be too expensive for the company. By law, such
archaeological surveys are required to be included in construction
budgets and done prior to commencing construction. Clearly the
company obtained approval to commence from the local government.
After the destroyed tombs were discovered, the work at the
construction site was stopped immediately and archaeological
investigations were started by the authorities. Despite clear legal
regulations, neither the heads of the construction company nor the
responsible members of the local government who issued the approval
388. See Yu, supra note 107, at 414 (questioning assertions that China could easily end piracy but
has not done so because of lack of "political willpower").
389. See id. at 419-24 (attributing problems for intellectual property enforcement in China to
heavy and continuous decentralization).
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faced punishment as the construction company's investment was too
important to the municipality.390
The complex socioeconomic conditions in China and the vast disparities in
wealth and innovative capacities across the country also make China an ideal site
for observing the tension between access and control in the protection of not
only cultural relics and intellectual property, but also that of intangible cultural
heritage. In fact, the challenges China currently faces may help it develop a more
pragmatic approach that helps bridge the differences between developed and
less-developed countries. On the one hand, China behaves like a developed
country; it understands the importance of protection in certain fast-growing
economic sectors-most notably those related to movies, computer programs,
semiconductors, and certain forms of biotechnology. 391 On the other hand, the
country sides with other less-developed countries and remains concerned about
the overprotection of intellectual property rights in the areas of pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, fertilizers, seeds, and foodstuffs. 392 China is also frustrated by the high
burden of protection and enforcement that is placed on source nations of
cultural relics.
In a previous article, I discussed four types of actions that may help improve
intellectual property protection in China: (1) educate the local people, (2) create
local stakeholders, (3) strengthen laws and enforcement mechanisms, and (4)
develop legitimate alternatives. 393 The first three types will work equally well
when applied to the protection of cultural relics. For example, education is likely
to "increas[e] the awareness and appreciation of the noneconomic value of
cultural items to Chinese society. '394 Indeed, many Chinese peasants who use
tomb robbing to "supplement their meager incomes .... have no idea of the
value of what they have excavated .... [I]gnorant of the prices that such artifacts
may bring at auctions in Hong Kong or New York, [they] often sell relics to
black market middlemen for a tiny fraction of the artifact's market value. '395
Likewise, the development of local stakeholders would provide the needed
constituency to push for stronger protection within the country. Improvements in
laws and enforcement mechanisms will certainly help strengthen the protection
of cultural relics. Indeed, the new Law on the Protection of Cultural Relics,
390. Stefan Gruber, Protecting China's Cultural Heritage Sites in Times of Rapid Change: Current
Developments, Practice and Law, 10 AsIA PAC. J. ENVTL. L. 253,282 (2007) (footnote omitted).
391. See Yu, supra note 285, at 25-26 (indicating China's likely preference for stronger
intellectual property protections in fast-growing industries).
392. See id. (indicating China's reluctance to strengthen intellectual property protection in areas
that are more likely to adversely affect China's self-interests).
393. Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331,428-37 (2003).
394. Dutra, supra note 98, at 94. For discussions of the use of educational programs to change
attitudes toward cultural relics, see id. at 94-95; PROT'r & O'KEEFE, supra note 44, at 332-36.
395. Dutra, supra note 98, at 71 (footnote omitted).
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which was enacted in 2002 to replace the old 1982 Cultural Relics Protection
Law, provides a good example of such improvement.396
Even the last suggestion, which focuses on the need for better alternatives,
can be useful in the cultural relics area. To date, many Chinese are reluctant to
report their finds to the authorities either because they will get into trouble or
because they have limited incentives for their efforts.397 However, their
reluctance will be greatly reduced if China introduces a system that would
provide more handsome rewards to those who make important discoveries of
cultural relics. 398 Instead of selling the relics in the black market, the personal
recognition and economic rewards might provide significant incentives for
finders to report the finds to the authorities.399
In a recent book chapter, I further discussed the importance of developing
an "enabling environment for effective intellectual property protection.'" 400 Such
an environment "provides the key preconditions for successful intellectual
property law reform, including a consciousness of legal rights, respect for the
rule of law, an effective and independent judiciary, a well-functioning innovation
and competition system," the existence of supportive legal and business
practices, "and a critical mass of local stakeholders. ' '40 1 If cultural patrimony
laws are to be effectively enforced, the development of these characteristics is
essential. It is also important to have a well-functioning protective regime with
supportive legal and business practices to preserve and display cultural relics. In
addition, the emergence of a critical mass of local stakeholders will help promote
396. See generally Law on the Protection of Cultural Relics (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2002, effective Oct. 28, 2002) (P.R.C.), available at
http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-10/09/content_75322.htm.
397. See Dutra, supra note 98, at 95 (advocating an "incentive program to reward bona fide
finders of cultural property with substantial cash payments or awards for turning over such objects to
the government"). As Dutra explained,
Although these awards do not have to be anywhere near the fair market value of the
discovered relic or artifact, many Chinese people would likely be willing to give the
government such property if the offered incentive is close to the amount that they would
obtain from black market traffickers.
Id. Because the finders are usually offered only "a tiny fraction of the artifact's market value," id. at
71, these incentive awards are unlikely to be costly.
398. For discussions of this incentive-based approach, see generally PROTT & O'KEEFE, supra
note 44, at 341-43; Dutra, supra note 98, at 95-96.
399. Unfortunately, such an approach sometimes may also promote tomb robbing. See Dutra,
supra note 98, at 95-96 (noting need to design incentive program in a way that would discourage
"tomb robbing or the plundering of other cultural sites"). It may also result in misreporting or
falsification of evidence-a recent example being the faked discovery of a very rare and endangered
South China tiger in Shaanxi Province. Shi Jingtao, Endangered Species in Photos Just a Paper Tiger,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 30, 2008, at 1. Nevertheless, no law and policy is abuse-proof, and the
penalty for misreporting and falsification may be sufficient to reduce those abuses.
400. Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 371, at 213.
401. Yu, supra note 285, at 20.
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greater protection of cultural relics from the inside, which no doubt will be more
effective than protection induced from the outside.4
In sum, the study of intellectual property protection may inform the study
of protection for cultural relics, and vice versa. This is particularly true in
countries that face significant challenges in protecting both cultural relics and
intellectual property. The study of protection in these two areas may further
inform the protection of intangible cultural heritage. After all, such heritage
consists of both intangible and cultural aspects. By studying the challenges
confronting the protection of both cultural relics and intellectual property, one
would gain important insight into the development of the new international
framework for the protection of intangible cultural heritage.
CONCLUSION
The protection of intangible cultural heritage has received growing
attention at both the domestic and international levels. Significant challenges
remain, however. If we are to develop a successful international framework for
the protection of intangible cultural heritage, we need to understand better the
conceptual basis of such protection-whether the protection is closer to that of
cultural relics or that of intellectual property. We also need to have a better
grasp of the different underlying objectives of the protection for intangible
cultural heritage while anticipating the challenges to implementing the new
framework. Until we do so, this framework is unlikely to provide meaningful
protection to intangible cultural heritage.
402. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners H, supra note 371, at 959 (noting importance of developing
local allies that would lobby government for stronger and more effective protection).
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